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ABSTRACT 
Sung-Ju Kim 
The Impact of Federal Government Welfare Expenditures on State Government 
Expenditures and Philanthropic Giving to Human Service Organizations: 2005-2006  
A sizeable body of research has attempted to examine the interaction between 
government spending and private giving known as the crowd-out effect. Most researchers 
reported that increases of government spending cause decreases of philanthropic giving 
to different types of nonprofits. However, few studies have attempted to indicate the 
interaction between government welfare expenditures and private giving to human 
service organizations even though human service organizations are the most sensitive to 
the changes of government spending. Additionally, the estimated crowd-out effects with 
a simple crowd-out model have been criticized for potential endogeneity bias. This paper 
investigates the total effect of federal government welfare spending on state government 
expenditures and philanthropic giving to human service organizations (known as joint 
crowd-out). I used the 2005 wave of the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) to 
estimate the effect of federal human service grants on state government spending on, and 
donations to human services. From these reduced-form estimates I infer the levels of 
simple and joint crowd-out. I found that indicate federal spending on public welfare 
crowds out private giving to human service organizations while holding control variables 
constant in the donations equation. However, federal government spending on public 
welfare crowds in state government spending on public welfare. 
 
Robert Vernon, PhD., Chair 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
A number of authors have strived to identify the funding resources for human 
service organizations and other nonprofits in the United States over the last several 
decades (Boris, Leon, Roeger & Nikolova, 2010; McMurtry, Netting, and Kettner, as 
cited in Kettner, 2002; Salamon, 1999). According to these studies, human service 
organizations have generally developed their funds from some combination of four 
sources: 1) government appropriations (e.g., direct government funds, contracts and 
grants, and tax benefits); 2) philanthropic contributions from individuals, corporations, 
and foundations; 3) service fees from clients; and 4) other resources (e.g., investments 
and profit-making subsidiaries). Studies on revenue sources for human service 
organizations reported more than half of total revenues for human service organizations 
comes from federal, state, or local government contracts and grants (Boris et al., 2010). 
The rest of the total budget for human service organizations was accounted for through 
private philanthropy, service fees, and other income.  
When comparing the percentage of government spending between human 
service organizations and all nonprofits, human service organizations heavily rely on 
government funding— almost twice as much as for all nonprofits.1 By comparison, 
human service organizations are highly vulnerable to impediments in their ability to meet 
goals and expectations in times of financial turmoil and low government revenues. 
                                           
1
 Salamon (1999) reported that almost 37 percent of total funding for nonprofit organizations in America 
came from service fees, 30 percent came from government, 22 percent came from private contributions 
including corporate and foundation giving, and 11 percent came from other income. According to the most 
recent study for the source of revenues for nonprofit organizations, the National Council of Nonprofits 
(2010) reported 27.4 percent of total revenues for all nonprofits came from government funding in 2008. In 
contrast, Boris et al. (2010) reported almost 60% of total budgets for human service organizations came 
from government funding, 19% came from private giving, 16% came from service fees, and 5% came from 
other incomes. 
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Therefore, it is critical that human service managers understand and direct the 
relationship with government funding. Specifically, identifying and managing the 
relationship between government spending on public welfare and the private giving to 
human service organizations is important for human service managers because more than 
three-quarters of the total revenue for human service organizations come from either 
government or philanthropy. 
Hence, for effectively and efficiently addressing financial challenges to human 
service organizations, it is important to investigate the interaction of the two fundamental 
fiscal factors—government spending and private giving. This research addresses the gap 
in our knowledge about the relationship between government spending and private giving 
by answering the following questions: what is the effect of total government welfare 
expenditures—both federal and state government welfare spending— on the changes in 
charitable giving to human service organizations?; and what is the total effect on both 
private giving to human service organizations and state welfare expenditures, when 
federal government welfare spending goes up by a dollar?  
Before scrutinizing the relationship between government welfare expenditures 
and charitable giving, a summary of the literature on fiscal challenges to nonprofit 
managers caused by government retrenchment of welfare spending in human service 
organizations is addressed, then theoretical frameworks relevant to this discussion is 
presented in this chapter.  
Managerial Challenges in HSOs 
Human service organizations have experienced enormous managerial challenges 
over the past 30 years. The challenges that often threaten the delivery of services to 
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clients are changing social policies, unstable economic conditions, shifting demographics, 
increasing service demands, rapidly developing technology, increasing expectations 
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of their performance, and greater emphasis on 
cost and performance accountability (Austin, Brody, & Packard, 2009; Bergman, Bowen, 
& Nygren, 1996; Hecht & Ramsey, 2002; Herman & Renz, 1998; Hopkins & Hyde, 2002; 
Salamon, 1996; Salamon, 2005). Salamon (2005) categorized these challenges under 
three main headings: fiscal, effectiveness, and competitive challenge.  
Among these three challenges, the fiscal challenge is the most formidable that 
human service organizations have faced. For example, Hopkins and Hyde (2002) found 
that human service managers were seriously concerned about fiscal crisis as their most 
crucial challenge. In 2001, a list of challenges to human service organizations was 
compiled from 115 managers representing 115 human service agencies. The most 
frequently reported challenges included lack of funds to meet agency goals (37.4%) and 
competition from other agencies for clients and/or funding (40.0%). Thus, financial 
challenges appeared to be a primary concern among human service managers.  
Several causes of fiscal crisis to human service organizations can be found such 
as government retrenchments on welfare expenditures, economic recessions, and other 
fiscal issues. In particular, after the federal government pursued an ongoing effort to 
reduce government expenditures on social welfare since the Reagan administration, fiscal 
challenges directly impacted human service organizations. Because of the inter-
dependency of their budgets with the government, human service organizations have 
been seriously affected on their budget by the changes of the government welfare policy. 
That is, in keeping with the keynote policy on welfare reform, federal spending on a 
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broad range of social welfare programs declined. At the same time, the demand for public 
assistance increased. For example, the poverty rate climbed to 13.1 percent in 1988— a 
rate that was higher than any year since before the War on Poverty programs in the 
middle-1960s (Stoesz & Karger, 1992). Since the Reagan administration attempted to 
reduce government welfare spending, human service organizations have faced both fiscal 
crisis and increases in service demands. A detailed picture of the impact of government 
retrenchment on welfare expenditures and other causes of financial challenges are 
addressed in the following sections.  
Fiscal challenges in HSOs: welfare retrenchments 
Before the Reagan presidency, government welfare spending had dramatically 
increased. For example, federal, state, and local government welfare spending increased 
from $208 million in 1923 to $4.9 billion in 1939. In 1933 welfare programs accounted 
for only 6.5 percent of all government expenditures; by 1939 that figure rose to 27.1 
percent (Katz, 1995). Federal government expenditure on public service (except military 
spending) in 1927 was only 3 percent of gross national product (GNP). By 1936, however, 
federal government expenditures (except military spending) grew to 10 percent of GNP 
(Fishback, Horrace, & Kantor, 2005).  
However, the retrenchment of welfare spending from the government began in 
1980 when former President Reagan declared at his first inauguration “government is not 
the solution to our problem.” (Levine, 1986, p.196) In fact, total government social 
welfare expenditures grew only 21 percent or less than 2 percent per year from 1977 to 
1989 (Salamon, 1999), which indicates a much lower rate of growth than that from 1986 
to 1977. According to Beck (2000), between 1980 and 1982 government expenditures 
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dropped by 3.9 percent and government spending on welfare programs dropped by 10.1 
percent. During the Reagan administration, funding for Aid for Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) was reduced by11.7 percent, and stiffer eligibility requirements were 
enacted. The Food Stamp program was reduced by 18.8 percent, and strikers and students 
became ineligible for benefits. The duration of unemployment insurance was reduced by 
13 weeks (Stoesz & Karger, 1992).  
After the Reagan administrations, efforts to recover from the government 
welfare cutbacks were attempted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but government 
welfare expenditures were not reversed to what they were before the Reagan years. 
However, major welfare reform was implemented by former President William Clinton. 
In his speech during the State of the Union on January 27
th
, 1996, President Clinton 
proclaimed “The era of big government may be over, but the era of big challenges for our 
country is not, and so we need an era of big citizenship.” Several months later, the 
President signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA) into law. PRWORA was broad in scope and negatively affected 
virtually all welfare programs including federal welfare entitlements (Rosenbaum & 
Darnel, 1997; Tanner, 1996).  
PRWORA contained a number of new measures for personal eligibility for 
welfare. First, the individual’s right to cash assistance from the federal government was 
abolished and was replaced by a lifetime maximum of five years during which a citizen 
can receive welfare benefits. Second, a crucial element of the American welfare state, 
AFDC, was eliminated and replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). Third, the use of food stamps was restricted, and finally, people on welfare were 
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required to work within two years of receiving benefits or they would be removed from 
the rolls (Patriquin, 2001). Clinton’s alterations to the welfare system were conducted 
based on four main themes for welfare reform: 1) make work pay, 2) strengthen the 
nation’s system of child support enforcement and collection, 3) provide education and 
training to poor people, and 4) place limits on the length of time that recipients are able to 
collect welfare benefits (Haveman & Scholz, 1994).  
As a result, PRWORA reduced the total amount of spending on welfare by 
federal and state governments. The federal contribution also changed from a matching 
grant to a block grant. The scope of government cutbacks was substantial. According to 
Salamon (1996), approximately $8.5 billion or 12 percent of federal spending on 
discretionary programs to nonprofit organizations for the 1996 fiscal year was cut from 
the previous fiscal year. Additionally, the cutbacks were even more severe in some fields: 
by 17 percent for the Social Service Block Grant; by 24 percent for disadvantaged 
housing; by 26 percent for community service; and by 34 percent for low-income energy 
assistance (Salamon, 1996).  
The retrenchment of government welfare spending was maintained under the G. 
W. Bush administration. President G. W. Bush and the Congress suggested that the 
federal spending on social welfare programs was reduced from FY 2005 through FY 
2010, outside of health and income assistance (Abramson & Salamon, 2005; Salamon, 
1996). The fields of education, social services, and community development experienced 
additional federal budget cut in the FY1997- FY2002 budget plan. After adjusting for 
inflation, the federal outlays fell by 39 percent for community and regional development 
programs, and by 10 percent for education, training, and social services (Abramson & 
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Salamon, 2005). In addition, according to the G. W. Bush administration’s budget 
proposals that were submitted to Congress, covering fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 
2011, nonprofit organizations expected a cumulative total of $78.6 billion in federal 
government spending below FY 2006 levels except for Medicare and Medicaid, after 
adjusting for inflation (Abramson, Salamon, & Russell, 2006).  
Fiscal challenges in HSOs: other causes 
Fiscal challenges for human service organizations are caused not only by the 
retrenchment of government welfare expenditures, but also by other financial challenges 
(e.g., economic recession). Several studies reported human service organizations had 
experienced budget cutbacks because of economic recessions. Boris et al. (2010) 
described the impact of economic recession on human service organizations with 
government contracts. They reported that almost 61 percent of human service 
organizations had experienced the government not paying the full cost of contracted 
services in the economic recession which started in late 2007. Twenty-one percent of 
human service organizations reported an experience with government funding which was 
worse in 2009 than in prior years. And 58 percent reported that the government changed 
contracts and grants since this current recession occurred. In addition, the National 
Council of Nonprofits (2010) indicated that 45 percent of human service providers 
reported that governments failed to pay the full cost of performing the contracts, leading 
to job cuts in 2009. As the studies indicated, government spending are vulnerable to 
economic conditions.  
In addition, government policy on welfare spending has been affected by other 
social issues such as liberal, neo-liberal, or conservative social values. For example, the 
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radical critiques of government-oriented social welfare provision have been strongly 
driven by liberal, neo-liberal, or conservative approaches, and social work professionals 
have been forced to re-identify the process of social work provisions. That is, those social 
values have suggested the political trends of providing social welfare were not only too 
paternalistic or too domineering, but also too permissive (Art & Gelissen, 2002; Hicks & 
Kenworthy, 2007; John & Pierson, 1997; Midgley, Tracy & Livermore, 2000). Therefore, 
not only government budget cuts but also economic recession and particular social values 
are additional causes of fiscal challenges for human service organizations. 
The Elements of Financial Resources for HSOs  
Researchers and practitioners have strived to describe the different budget 
resources for human service organizations with different approaches. For example, 
McMurtry et al. (1991, as cited in Kettner, 2002) reported the funding sources for human 
service organizations as government contracts, charitable contributions, client fees, public 
grants, private grants, and other sources. Similarly, Lohmann (1980) identified five 
categories of funding resources for human service organizations: government funding 
from tax-based sources, fees, grants, organized fund drives, and charitable contributions. 
In general, the sources of revenue for human service organizations are identified as the 
following: 1) government contracts, grants and tax benefits; 2) philanthropic giving; 3) 
service fees; and 4) other resources. 
Among these identified revenue sources, government spending and 
philanthropic contributions are particularly important revenue sources for human service 
organizations. Salamon (1999) indicated the portion of the budget for all nonprofit 
organizations with the four different financial resources. According to Salamon (1999), 
9 
 
 
 
almost 30 percent of total revenue for all nonprofit organizations came from government 
contracts and grants. The National Council of Nonprofits (2010) provided the most recent 
information about the source of revenues for all nonprofit organizations. The Council 
reported that almost 26.4 percent of total revenue for nonprofit organizations came from 
government spending. However, human service organizations have a different portion of 
government funding than other nonprofits. As shown in Figure 1, Boris and her 
colleagues addressed the allocation of revenue for human service organizations. They 
reported that almost 60 percent of their funding was provided by the government in 2009. 
Private philanthropy was 19 percent, service fees were 16 percent, and other income was 
5 percent (Boris et al., 2010).  
Figure 1. Financial Resources for Human Service Organizations 
 
 
Goveremnt 
grants  
60% 
Private 
giving 
19% 
Service fees 
16% 
Other 
resources 
5% 
[SOURCE] Boris, E. T., Leon, E. D., Roeger, K. L., & Nikolova, M. (2010). Human 
service nonprofits and government collaboration: Findings from the 2010 national 
survey of nonprofit government contracting and grants. Center on Nonprofit and 
Philanthropy at Urban Institute Working Paper, p18. 
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In a detailed picture of government contracts and grants for human service 
organizations, Boris et al. (2010) reported that government agencies had approximately 
200,000 contracts and grants with about 33,000 human service organizations in 2009. 
That is, each human service organization had almost six contracts and grants in 2009.   
The second important financial resource for human service organizations is 
charitable donations. Due to a limited ability to increase service fees for clients, 
charitable donations have become the most important funding resource that human 
service managers aim to develop other than government funds. Since the government has 
retrenched spending on social welfare, human service managers have increased their 
intention to develop private contributions to make up for cutbacks in government support. 
According to Goss (1989), the fundraising initiatives for private charity such as hiring 
professional fundraisers and increasing fundraising events have increased in human 
service organizations since the welfare reforms instituted by the Reagan administration. 
Kettner (2002) stressed charitable contributions have become a significant part of many 
nonprofit agencies’ annual revenue.    
Donations have come from a variety of sources such as individuals, foundations, 
corporations, and private charities. According to the Giving USA Foundation (2011), 
estimated charitable giving from American individuals, corporations, and foundations 
was $290.89 billion in 2010. Among total contributions in 2010, human service 
organizations received an estimated $26.9 billion (9% of the total) in contributions, the 
third largest amount received among all types of nonprofits.  
Additionally, both service fees and other income are other components of 
revenue sources for nonprofit organizations. However, service fees and other income are 
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important sources for nonprofits’ income except for human service organizations. For 
example, the National Council of Nonprofits (2010) reported almost 50 percent of the 
total revenue for nonprofit organizations came from fees for services in 2008, and other 
income was 12.4 percent. However, for human service organizations only 16 percent of 
the total revenue came from service fees and 5 percent came from other income (Boris et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, it is unlikely that human service organizations can apply the 
financial strategies of increasing service fees and increasing investments. Human service 
managers have always approached service fees and investments with a certain amount of 
ambivalence. Human service organizations do not exist to make money because their 
mission is to help people in need. They aim to help individuals, families, and 
communities deal with a range of complex social, interpersonal, and individual problems.  
People eager for their services are in need of help from others and are unable to 
pay beyond a certain amount for services. People with a very limited budget may decide 
that services are not a priority if they must compete for food, clothing, or shelter. 
According to Kettner (2002), the demand for services from clients unable to pay has 
increased while the demand for services from clients able to pay personally or via 
insurance has decreased. Therefore, there is a limit to increasing the service fees.  
It is also difficult to apply business marketing strategies to human service 
organizations because human service organizations are typically driven by causes rather 
than by profits. Also, business strategies may not be effectively applied due to the 
crucially important features of nonprofit organization: (a) the value produced by 
nonprofit organizations lies in the achievement of social purposes rather than in 
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generating revenues; and (b) nonprofit organizations receive revenues from sources other 
than customer purchases (Moore, 2000).  
The Importance of Understanding Financial Management for HSOs 
Financial management is a significant managerial function for human service 
organizations because all stakeholders in the organization such as clients, staff, boards, 
and donors have enormous interest in the effective management of fiscal resources. Ezell 
(2009) noted that clients care about effective financial management because they believe 
it is associated with better quality and quantity of services. The staff are also interested 
because fiscal conditions of their organization are directly associated with their salaries 
and benefits, ongoing work conditions, and the amount of resources they can devote to 
programs. In addition, donors such as government agencies, foundations, and private 
individuals are always concerned about the utilization of funds because they pay attention 
to the accomplishment of client service objectives and ongoing provision of funds to the 
organization.  
Traditionally, financial management has been considered as developing and 
managing budgets and monitoring expenditures to secure the purposes of organizational 
spending and the efficiency of that spending. For example, Austin et al. (2009) describe 
financial management as fund development (e.g., writing proposals for grants or contracts) 
and preparing and monitoring budgets. The expected managerial capacity to manage 
fiscal factors includes ensuring that revenue streams are stable and adequate, that 
expenditures are within budget, and that account procedures are followed. In human 
service organizations, the responsibility of developing funds has been considered the 
board of directors’ domain. The responsibility to direct the expenditures of budgets has 
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been regarded as a CEO or CFO’s job. For example, Poertner (2006) and Poertner and 
Rapp (2007) stated that some authors stress it is not necessary to acknowledge the skills 
of financial management for human service managers because the responsibility for 
financial management lies with the chief financial officers (e.g., accountant or finance 
specialists).  
However, it is necessary for managers to know how to interpret various financial 
management and monitoring reports because an agency’s strategic plan should influence 
annual budgets as agency priorities change and agency leaders navigate opportunities in a 
constantly dynamic environment (Ezell, 2009). Furthermore, agency relationships with 
external funding resources should be analyzed when an agency has developed a strategic 
plan. In order for their organizations to survive and grow, human service managers must 
efficiently and effectively manage the human, financial, informational, and physical 
resources needed to accomplish fundraising, grant writing, and marketing  
Weinbach (2008) stressed that financial management capacity such as writing 
grant proposals, negotiating contracts, and finding creative ways to obtain money from 
charitable contributions has taken on ever-increasing importance. In addition, human 
service managers have been pressured to devote themselves to developing funds in recent 
years because of increased competition for funding, decreased government funds, and 
other developments (e.g., block grants and privatization of services). The responsibility of 
developing funds also falls to the director and other managers when board members are 
either unwilling or unable to perform this function. As a result, developing fundraising 
skills and knowledge has become increasingly important to human service managers. 
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According to Weinbach (2008), managers in human service organizations openly spend 
more time attempting to raise money than they do spending it.  
Understanding the Interaction of Government spending and Charity 
In addition to understanding the various revenue sources for human service 
organizations, human service managers should be able to identify the essential 
relationship among the different types of funding resources and the implications of the 
relationship for their organization. Due to a higher dependence on government funds, 
identifying and managing relationships with government funding is an important 
managerial responsibility for human service managers. That is, managers in human 
service organizations should be able to identify the domain within which the agency fits 
and develop a fundraising strategy to target the appropriate government funds. 
Specifically, it is critical for managers to understand how receiving government funding 
affects the level of philanthropic contributions to their organizations. 
Researchers in public policy, public economics, or nonprofit management have 
devoted their energy to identifying the nature of the relationship between government 
welfare expenditure and philanthropic giving and its impact on nonprofit organizations, 
yet the nature of the relationship remains ill-defined. Theory specification of the 
government and private giving relations delineates two main effects on donors: 1) 
increased spending reduces the marginal gain to donating, hence reduces donations, 2) 
spending targeted at particular organizations acts as a quality signals, hence increasing 
donations. Based on the theoretical frameworks, empirical studies have examined which 
effect dominates. Some studies find crowd-out effect (e.g., Andreoni & Payne, 2003; 
Kingma, 1989; Schiff, 1990; Steinberg, 1985 ), some studies find crowd-in effect (e.g., 
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Payne, 2001; Schiff, 1985, Smith, 2007), and some find no statistically significant effect 
(e.g., Khanna, Posnett, & Sandler, 1995; Lindsey & Steinberg, 1990) 
Although the theoretical and empirical studies of government spending and 
charitable giving have addressed crowd-out or-in effect to some extent, there have been 
limitations to generalizing the findings. For example, most studies on crowd-out effect 
have been examined not with human service organizations, but with other types of 
nonprofit organizations such as public radio stations, art organizations, religious 
organizations, or elite universities. The nature of the relationship between government 
spending and private giving likely differs among different types of nonprofit 
organizations because of the varied composition of the revenue streams. Horne (2005, as 
cited in Tinkelman, 2009) notes that only one percent of the revenues of the religious 
sector was provided by government, while 56 percent of revenues of the nonprofits 
related to criminal issues was provided through government spending. Nonprofits 
associated with international affairs received 58 percent of their revenues from 
philanthropic donations; whereas hospitals formulated less than one percent of their 
budget from private giving.  
Second, even though a few studies examined the interaction between 
government welfare expenditures and private giving to human service organizations (e.g., 
Amos, 1982; Schiff, 1990; Payne, 2001), researchers asserted the estimated interaction 
between government spending and private giving to human service organizations had 
limitations. Horne (2005) and Payne (2009) indicated problems with the quality of 
available data. Smith (2006) and Steinberg (1990) noted statistical errors. Therefore, 
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studying the crowd-out effect between government spending and private giving should 
use multidimensional approaches.  
A better understanding of the nature of the relationship between government 
spending and private giving to human service organizations will provide a wide variety of 
benefits for human service managers. Obviously, research concerning the interaction of 
government spending and charitable giving provides insight on two levels—the 
effectiveness of financial management and overall social welfare policy. That is, human 
service managers would be able to develop more effective strategic financial plans if they 
knew that government spending acted as positive signals for private giving. For example, 
if part of the cost is hidden as future crowd-out of private giving, knowing the true cost of 
applying for government funding is important to managers in human service 
organizations. Tinkelman (2009) asserted that managers in nonprofits need to more 
accurately understand the interaction between government spending and charity in order 
to best select among funding alternatives and to optimize fundraising campaigns.  
In addition, a better understanding of the interaction between government 
welfare spending and charitable contributions provides insight into ranking political 
positions about the government’s role in providing public goods. For example, when total 
philanthropic giving was dramatically increased from $130.89 billion in 1995 to $157.69 
billion in 1997 (Beck, 2000), crowd-out theories attributed the increase in private giving 
that occurred in 1996 and 1997 to a public response to the Clinton administration’s 
welfare reform. Khanna and Sandler (2000) posited that knowing the interaction between 
government spending and private giving to nonprofit organizations has crucial public 
policy implications during a time in which governments are debating whether the private 
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sector can replace government support to nonprofit organizations for providing public 
goods.  
Therefore, policy makers are interested in the ultimate level of public service 
provisions in order to decide the best funding mix for organizations to provide public 
goods. The effective level of public service provisions would be drawn based on a better 
understanding of the extent to which private contributions react to changes in government 
spending. Additionally, Steinberg (1993) emphasized that understanding the relationship 
between government spending and charitable giving is important in the design of tax 
code provisions concerning charitable donations.  
Clearly, it is necessary for managers and nonprofit researchers to articulate an 
accurate relationship between government spending and private giving. Particularly, 
managers in human service organizations should strive to create a more intimate 
relationship with government by increasing their interaction with policymakers through 
lobbying and networking with external resources.  
Theoretical Frameworks  
A number of theoretical approaches to organization-environment relations have 
been developed in recent decades since Katz and Kahn (1996, as cited in Kettner, 2002) 
addressed the applicability of systems concepts to social work practice. Each theoretical 
framework provides particular perceptions of how organizational structures, 
administrative processes, and patterns of management are associated with external 
environments.  
A number of authors offered theoretical frameworks to explain the interaction 
between human service organizations and the environment, known as organizational 
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adaptation theories. The concept of adaptation includes buffering, bridging, sensing, and 
understanding the changing conditions of the environment (Evelyn, 2009; Hasenfeld, 
2009). The purpose of adaptation is to maximize the effectiveness in adapting 
performances to ensure survival and to minimize the dependency on external 
organizations in the decision-making process. While interacting with the external 
environment, organizations gain knowledge about the impact of changes from the 
external environment, their strengths and weaknesses, and strategies for survival in their 
environment.  
The main theoretical approaches that rely on this active process of adaptation are 
contingency theory, resource dependence theory, and political economy theory (Evelyn, 
2009; Glisson, 1981; Hasenfeld, 2009; Jaskyte & Lee, 2006; Lecovich, 2001; Schmid, 
2004, 2009; Wamsley & Zald, 1973; Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). According to 
Hasenfeld (2009), these main theories address the most appropriate frameworks for 
analyzing the relationships between human service organizations and the fiscal 
environment.  
Contingency theory 
Before examining fiscal relationship theories, contingency theory should be 
considered because it provides an important paradigm for analyzing organizational 
structure related to the external environment. Glisson (1981) noted that the contingency 
approach provides a context for considering the unique characteristics of organizational 
systems that deliver services to human beings. In other words, this theory depicts 
organizational dynamic relations with both internal and external components of the 
organization.  
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This theory considers an organization as a social system that is interconnected 
with subsystems or the external environment. Hence, the contingency approach 
emphasizes the managers’ responsibility not only to direct the functioning within the 
internal environment, but also to ensure desirable relations with the external environment 
(Glisson, 1981). According to Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich (2010), contingency theory asserts 
that managers should understand the three types of environmental elements that impact 
organizational management: 1) adaptation to the task environment, 2) adaptation to new 
technology, and 3) adaptation to the scale of production. Adaptation to the task 
environment refers to identifying the organizational structure and pattern of management 
as either organic or mechanistic. That is, in organizations with mechanistic structures, 
managers may focus on directing the internal environment because mechanistic firms 
predominated among the firms operating in a relatively stable task environment. Thus, 
managers have few chances to interact with the external environment. In contrast, an 
organic form of organization which is hierarchically flat in feature in terms of non-
bureaucratic organizational structure tends to have a higher incidence of dynamic 
interaction with the external environment. Therefore, managers in organizations with 
organic structure should be able to evaluate the construction of their organization with 
regard to the external environment.  
For human service organizations the organizational mechanisms are more likely 
to be an organic type because human service organizations predominantly depend on 
external resources to provide services to clients. Since human service organizations 
heavily depend on government agencies to provide funding for services, managers must 
understand the contingent approach to develop various strategies such as buffering and 
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bridging to adapt to the external environment. In addition, because consistent and 
adequate benefits from service fees and investments are not available for human service 
organizations, managers should focus on developing managerial strategies based on 
contingency theory.  
Furthermore, managers using contingency theory are more likely to adopt new 
technology because the types of technology used by an organization are often seen as 
highly determinative of the structural arrangement (Zhao et al., 2010). Finally, the size of 
the organization is an important element in determining organizational structure and 
process for managers in human service organizations. Using contingency theory, 
managers should be able to indicate the effect of growth on the scale of operation for 
their organizations.   
In summary, contingency theory provides a theoretical perspective considering 
an organization as one element in a social system. It also demonstrates that to effectively 
conduct their organization, managers should attempt to understand the relationship 
between the external environment (e.g., government welfare policies, pattern of 
charitable giving, and community resources) and their organization. Schmid (2009) stated 
that an organization which identifies and interacts with environmental components is 
more likely to have higher performance levels as well as a better chance of survival than 
one which does not. Therefore, contingency theory provides a significant rationale for 
understanding the interaction between government welfare spending and private giving to 
human service organizations in order to survive and thrive in intensively competitive 
environments.  
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Resource dependence theory 
A second theoretical perspective for understanding the importance of the 
interaction between government welfare expenditures and private giving to human 
service organizations is resource dependence theory. Resource dependence theory 
explains the distribution of power within an organization by focusing on the 
organization’s dependence on the environment (Jun & Armstrong, 1997). Resource 
dependence theory emphasizes political and economic dependencies on the environment. 
Since Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proclaimed the importance of understanding the 
resource dependence theory, researchers have indicated that organizations would 
experience uncertainty of their survival depending on their adaptation to their 
environments (Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2010; Evelyn, 2009; Hasenfeld, 2009; Hatch, 
1997; Lecovich, 2001; Schmid, 2004). 
Organizational dependency is defined as “The product of importance of a given 
input or output to the organization and the extent to which it is controlled by relatively 
few organizations” (Pfeffer & Salancik, as cited in Lecovich, 2001, p. 23). That is, 
“dependence” is the organization’s need to construct internal mechanisms in order to 
manage or adapt to its external environments. The degree of organizational dependency, 
then, can be measured as the potency of the external organizations in the given 
organization’s environment—particularly, in the process of the organization’s decision-
making.  
Based on these conceptual frames, Evelyn (2009) and Schmid (2004) predicted 
that an organization must exchange resources in order to survive and that, in exchanges, 
power differences must arise. Particularly, the power-dependence issue matters for human 
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service organizations because human service organizations are heavily dependent on a 
variety of external financial resources (Smith, as cited in Lecovich, 2001). Smith (as cited 
in Lecovich, 2001) examined three types of human service organizations in Israel and 
found that the organizations were particularly affected when they developed their 
strategies and structures under pressure of external resources. Therefore, it would 
behoove managers in human service organizations to change their power-dependence 
relations with the environment and direct their activities toward maximizing their ability 
to acquire resources and minimizing the control by the external environment over their 
internal operations.  
In summary, resource dependence theory provides a theoretical rationale for 
managers in human service organizations to manage their power and resource 
dependency on the external environment. First, they should reduce dependence on the 
external environments as much as possible by controlling necessary resources. They also 
should increase dependence of agents in the environment on the distinctive service and/or 
products of the organizations.  
Political economy theory 
Political economy theory is another significant theory which provides theoretical 
rationale to understand the interaction between government spending and private giving 
to human service organizations. Political economy theory focuses on organizational 
dependence on two fundamental resources: 1) legitimacy and power (political resources) 
and 2) production (economic) resources. The essential perspective of political economy 
theory is that organizations depend on the resources controlled by agents and interest 
groups in the external environment (Hasenfeld, 2009; Schmid, 2009). That is, in order to 
23 
 
 
 
survive and produce services, organizations must amass both political resources and 
economic resources. 
Political resources refer to matters of legitimacy and distribution of power as 
they affect the propriety of an agency’s existence (Hasenfeld, 2009). Economic resources 
refer to the maximization of efficiency and the combination of factors affecting the cost 
of producing and delivering a given level of services (Wamsley & Zald, 1973). According 
to Hasenfeld (2009), the core activities of an organization are determined by the rules and 
agreements of how resources are mainly assigned in the organization. Wamsley and Zald 
(1973) noted that the rules emerge through the process of negotiation and bargaining 
between political resources and economic resources which provide input to establish and 
maintain the organization.  
The key theoretical concept of the political economy approach is that 
organizational activities are directed by interrelationships between political and economic 
resources. In particular, the interrelationship between the structure of legitimacy and 
power (political resources) and the system for producing and exchanging goods and 
services (economic resources) is an important element in determining organizational 
regulations and rules. Furthermore, through modification of the resource-allocation rules, 
significant organizational changes could arise such as establishment, termination, or 
alteration of services. This approach is important for human service managers because the 
activities of their organizations heavily rely on government welfare policy. Because of 
insufficient resources, human service organizations must be efficient and effective in 
producing and providing services. Therefore, based on the political economy approach, 
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human service managers should acknowledge the interrelationship of political and 
economic factors. 
In summary, contingency theory indicates the importance of understanding an 
organization’s interaction with the external environment. As part of the interaction with 
the external environment, contingency theory supports the necessity of understanding the 
relationship between government funding and private giving to human service 
organizations. According to contingency theory, managers in human service organizations 
should devote their efforts to interacting with their external environment to respond to 
exogenous increases in demands for their services. This is an important managerial 
responsibility because managing the interaction with the external environment is 
significantly associated with an organization surviving and thriving.  
Resource dependence theory provides a theoretical rationale to understand the 
interaction between government funding for welfare provisions and private giving to 
human service organizations. According to resource dependence theory, managers are 
more likely to respond to cutbacks in preferred sources of revenues by pursuing less-
preferred areas because directors should aim to change their power and resource 
dependence on the external environment. Managers should increase their efforts to obtain 
all available funding based on the most effective budget plans in order to change their 
power-dependence relations with the environment. In order to maximize autonomy of the 
organization in relations with the external environment, particularly government relations, 
human service managers should understand the impact of government funding and 
private giving to human service organizations because these two funding sources are their 
most important financial resources.  
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In addition, political economy theory supports the importance of the relationship 
between government welfare provisions and human service organizations. Political 
economy theory emphasizes organizational dependence on political and economic 
resources. Specifically, the surviving or thriving (even the existence) of human service 
organizations heavily depends on political legitimacy for welfare provisions. That is, 
based on government rhetoric of welfare policy, human service organizations may or may 
not face crucial financial challenges. According to political economy theory, 
organizational activities are affected by interactions between political and economic 
resources. Therefore, knowing the interaction between government welfare spending and 
private giving to human service organizations helps managers in human service 
organizations drive the political legitimacy for welfare toward affordability of the 
organization.  
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Chapter Two:  
The Impact of Public Welfare Expenditures on Philanthropic Giving  
The first research question is how changes in one source of income will interact 
with other income streams of human service organizations. That is, if the government 
increases funding for children in poverty, will private donations for children in poverty 
fall? Similarly, if a social work agency working for children in poverty receives or 
acquires new government spending (e.g., grants from the Child Poverty Act, 2010), will 
overall philanthropic giving to the agency, not only for child aid programs, but for all of 
its programs, fall? This question is associated with the ‘simple’ crowding effect between 
government spending and philanthropic giving to charity.  
The main research question is what is the total effect of government welfare 
expenditures on private giving while considering the three components: federal spending, 
state spending, and private contributions, known as the ‘joint’ crowding effect. In order to 
identify the impact of the changes of government spending on welfare on private giving 
to human service organizations, two level of government spending were identified- 
federal and state government spending. Thus, the measurement of crowd-out becomes 
more complicated. Federal expenditures changes directly cause changes in both state 
government spending and donations. In turn, the induced change in state government 
spending causes a further change in donations. The combined effect of both causal paths 
is called “joint” crowd-out.   
Describing the interaction is complex: directions of revenue interaction vary 
depending on types of nonprofits and a number of identified factors; a wide range of 
interaction effects were estimated based on addressed data resources for study; and a 
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various arguments about statistical analysis to exam crowd-out effects. Due to the 
complexities initiating interaction between government spending and private giving, 
these relationships need to be studied from various angles. Even though a large number of 
studies have attempted to measure the interactions between government spending and 
private giving, the job is far from finished. In particular, the existing empirical studies 
ignore the interaction between federal, state, and nonprofit revenue streams when 
estimating the crowd-out effect (Steinberg, 1993). The extent of the joint crowd-out is 
crucial for evaluating the efficacy of federal grants for social services. The study of joint 
crowd-out can provide detailed insight into the interaction between federal government 
spending for the public good and private giving to charity.  
Before examining the relationship between government spending and 
philanthropic giving to human service organizations, empirical background of the crowd-
out is presented in this chapter, including a conceptual definition of crowd-out or-in and 
the joint crowd-out; empirical results from prior studies on crowd-out; data resources, 
econometric specification, and data analysis for this study.  
Definition of Simple, Joint Crowd-Out and Significance of Joint Crowd-Out 
As briefly indicated above, the term “crowding effect” refers to the concurrent 
changes in private giving to a public good when government funding for the same good is 
changed either negatively or positively. In responding to an increase in government 
expenditures (either in the form of direct service provision or through grants and 
contracts with nonprofit organizations), philanthropic individuals may decrease their 
donations. Economists refer to this phenomenon as crowd-out. The same effect can occur 
in the opposite direction. Government spending may escalate private giving to charity 
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because the government spending signals the quality of a public good. This phenomenon 
is identified as crowd-in.  
Steinberg (1993) posited the estimated negative coefficient of the interaction 
between government spending and private giving to charity as the ‘simple’ crowd-out: the 
effect of aggregate government spending on aggregate donations. As illustrated in Figure 
2, simple crowd-out estimates the relationship between government spending and charity, 
all else held constant. The simple crowd-out has been much studied both theoretically and 
empirically. Tinkelman (2009) found 46 empirical studies were associated with the 
simple crowd-out including Garrett and Rhine (2007), the most recent study in his 
research.  
Figure 2. Simple Crowd-Out 
 
 
Source: Steinberg, R. (1989). The theory of crowding out: Donations, local government spending, and the 
“New federalism”, p.12. 
 
However, the simple crowd-out model has been criticized by researchers. For 
example, the estimation approach with simple crowd-out model has been criticized as 
suffering from endogeneity bias (Kingma, 1989; Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1987). While 
indicating the limitation of the simple crowd- out model, researchers suggested some 
alternatives to indicate the relationship between government spending and private giving 
such as 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Square), instrumental variable techniques, or indect least 
Federal & Local Government welfare spending  
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squares estimation of joint crowd-out (Payne, 1998; Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1990). 
Specifically, Steinberg (1987, 1990, 1993) asserted the joint crowd-out can be an 
alternative to estimate the interaction between government spending and private giving to 
charity without endogeneity.  
As indicated in Figure 3, joint crowd-out estimates the relationship between 
government expenditures and private giving while considering exogenous changes when 
the federal government transfers grants to state governments. That is, the joint crowd-out 
model estimates the total effect of federal government spending on both state government 
spending and private giving.  
The basic assumption for joint crowd-out is that federal government spending 
has a wide variety of intertwining links because federal spending affects both state 
spending and private donations. Because state government spending and private 
donations both react to federal spending, the interaction between the changes in federal 
spending and the changes in state spending should be estimated in order to indicate the 
total effect of government spending on private giving. That is, joint crowd-out estimates 
the sum of direct and feedback effects.  
Figure 3. Joint Crowd-Out 
 
 
Source: Steinberg, R. (1989). The theory of crowding out: Donations, local government spending, and the 
“New federalism”, p.12. 
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30 
 
 
 
 
In addition, another advantage of examining joint crowd-out to estimate the 
interaction between government spending and private giving is that joint crowd-out 
estimation can provide political insight about federal government centered welfare 
provision, which is federalism. According to Steinberg (1990), if the estimated coefficient 
indicates total joint crowd-out—which is dollar-for-dollar crowd-out, the federal 
government should not provide public services because voluntary donations would 
completely replace government spending.
2
 If there is joint crowd-in, the federal 
government expenditures are significantly efficient. This finding can provide political 
perspective about welfare provision. Therefore, joint crowd-out estimation is important to 
estimate an accurate crowd-out relationship between government welfare spending and 
private giving to human service organizations.  
Theory of Joint Crowd-Out 
Insofar as examination of crowd-out is important for indicating the government’s 
ability to provide public services, along with individuals’ motivation for giving, a large 
body of studies has been examined for crowd-out effects. Previous empirical and 
theoretical studies have generally concluded that government expenditures partially 
crowd out private donations. The previous scholarship on the crowd-out hypothesis has 
examined several models based on the crowd-out theory, such as the simple crowd-out 
model and the joint crowd-out model.  
  
                                           
2
 Steinberg(1990)’s conclusion holds whenever positive donations occur at the desired level of total 
spending. Because donations cannot be negative, a sufficiently large amount expenditure would increase 
total spending.  
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Simple crowd-out model 
Early theories of donations for public goods, such as Warr (1982), Roberts 
(1984), and Bernheim (1986), were developed based on the assumption that individuals 
have complete information on the menu of charities available and express their demands 
for the public goods through their donations (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Rose-
Ackerman,1986). At one extreme, if donors derive utility solely from the provision of the 
charitable expenditures regardless of the source of funding, Warr (1982), Roberts (1984), 
and Bernheim (1986) proved that government spending on the public good crowds out 
donations to the same kind of public goods on a dollar-for- dollar basis (“completes 
crowd-out”): that is, one dollar of government subsidies will displace one dollar of 
philanthropy. This is because the increases in government expenditures, financed by 
taxing the donors, acts just like a redistribution of income.  
However, a dollar-for-dollar crowd-out model was consistently rejected with 
statistical confidence by most empirical studies of simple crowd-out including Andreoni 
(2006), Heutel (2009), and Payne (1989). The studies asserted that a dollar-for-dollar 
replacement is only guaranteed under strong assumptions: that donors are purely altruistic 
in their giving and care only about the total provision of a charitable good ; that donors 
are indifferent between giving directly or giving indirectly by being taxed (Andreoni, 
2006; Heutel, 2009; Payne, 1998, 1989).  
The empirical studies with crowd- out effect following studies by Warr (1982) 
and Roberts (1984) have typically produced results based on the simple crowd-out model 
in which either fixed-sum government spending or government production reduce private 
giving. For example, Cuellar (2004) estimated the impact of government expenditures to 
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social welfare on total level of contributions to the poor based on Roberts (1984, cited in 
Cuellar, 2004)’s general methodology, which examined the simple crowd-out hypothesis. 
Horne (2006) examined the relationship between the change in government subsidy from 
1998 to 1999 and the change in charitable giving from 1999 to 2000 using Form 990 data.  
Although the simple crowd-out studies estimated a certain degree of crowd-out 
coefficients between government spending and private giving to charity, researchers 
indicated limitations of the results from the simple crowd-out studies. Steinberg (1987), 
Kingma (1989), and Smith (2006) asserted that if the interaction between government 
spending and private giving to charity is performed with OLS (Ordinal Least Squares), 
then the estimated coefficient with the simple crowd-out is biased and inconsistent 
because the government spending variable is endogenous.
3
 For example, when people 
increased their demand for welfare services when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 
2005, we would expect demands for both government and private contributions to be 
high. Undoubtedly, in response to high demand, private giving and public spending to 
provide public services should be increased. Thus, the estimated coefficient between 
government spending and private giving has more chance to be biased if we do not 
consider the situation, which is one of endogeneity.  
Rose-Ackerman (1986) stated two limitations of the assumption for the simple 
crowd-out model (failure to consider various features of nonprofits and ignoring 
regulation of government funds) and demonstrated that government spending need not 
crowd out private donations. She probed the possibility that fixed-sum grants can 
                                           
3
 Endogeneity arises if there is a correlation between the parameter and the error term in the estimated 
regression equation. If the estimated coefficient β is associated with ε, the estimated coefficient is biased 
and inconsistent. Endogeneity exists when the model includes an endogenous explanatory variable 
(Chenhall & Moers, 2007). 
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increase private giving if they are accompanied by regulatory policies that raise the 
marginal benefits of private contributions.  
Joint crowd-out model 
Local governments receive grants from federal government in the forms of 
categorical assistance and general assistance such as revenue sharing. Thus, local 
government expenditures are precisely sensitive to changes in federal government funds. 
Simultaneously, local government is sensitive to change in individual donations. 
Therefore, Steinberg (1989) stated that federal government expenditures may be expected 
to alter both private donations and local government spending. In turn, induced changes 
in donations in local government expenditures have feedback effects on donations and 
vice versa (Steinberg, 1987). The total effect of the change of federal government 
spending on the changes of state government spending and private spending is denoted as 
joint crowd-out.  
Steinberg (1987) developed a theoretical treatment of the joint crowd-out model 
that depends on a decisive voter model in which the voters are cognizant of private 
donors and of simple crowd-out, and vote accordingly (Lindsey & Steinberg, 1990). The 
fundamental assumption for the joint crowd-out model is that federal government 
transfers to state governments are exogenous. According to the joint crowd-out model, 
the exogenous changes in federal government spending affect both the changes in private 
donations and the changes in state and local government expenditures. The ultimate total 
effect should be regarded in order to estimate the interaction between government 
expenditures and private donations because each individual regards the donations of 
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others, state spending and federal spending as perfect substitutes for one another or vice 
versa.  
Steinberg (1987, 1989) stated that joint crowd-out can be partial, zero, or 
negative in political-economic equilibrium. Joint crowd-out is generally partial, i.e., total 
expenditures will rise and donations will fall, but to a smaller degree than the total grants. 
This result is guaranteed if the simple crowding out of donations is partial. When there is 
simple crowd-in of donations, joint crowd-out is also likely to be partial, but zero or joint 
crowd-in is also possible. If there is a total simple crowd-out, which is a dollar-for-dollar 
crowd-out, then either state spending or total donations must be zero. In this case, joint 
crowd-out is not well defined. The joint crowd-out model is quite complicated. Some of 
these conclusions can be changed when federal grants are of the matching variety. For 
example, matching grants reduce the marginal costs of induced local government 
spending. Thus a matching grant will be able to purchase a larger service increment. With 
matching grants, the tendency toward partial joint crowd-out is reduced or reversed and 
total spending may go up by an amount that exceeds the grants (Steinberg, 1989).  
Empirical Results: Crowd-Out/-In or Neither  
Since the late 1970s, researchers have measured the effect of a change in 
government funding for nonprofit organizations on private donations. The studies were 
attempted with a variety of processes using various datasets such as organizational level 
data, surveys of giving, and aggregates of individual income tax return data. Horne (2005) 
summarized the previous research on the crowd effect at two different levels: 1) at the 
aggregate level, examining government spending on public services or the interaction 
between overall government spending and total giving to charity (e.g., Abrams & 
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Schmitz, 1984; Jones, 1983; Steinberg, 1985, as cited in Horne, 2005); and, 2) at the 
organizational level, examining the interaction between government expenditures for 
specific charitable organizations (e.g., Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Borgonovi, 2006; Dokko, 
2009; Gruber & Hungerman, 2007; Hughes & Luksetich, 1999). Tinkelman (2009) 
summarized empirical studies of interaction between government funding and donations 
by the aggregated level of data such as Form 990s data, surveys of giving to different 
types of charity, and individual income tax data for charitable giving.  
Table 1 is a summary of 45 published or unpublished empirical studies 
indicating the interaction between government spending and private giving to nonprofit 
organizations in this study. The writer counted 21 studies which probed some degree of 
crowd-out coefficients; 5 studies which reported crowd-in coefficients; 11 studies which 
found both crowd-out and –in depending on the different types of nonprofit organizations 
or different levels of the government funds; and 8 studies which found no statistically 
significant relationship between government spending and private giving. Fifteen studies 
indicated crowd effects between government welfare expenditures and private giving to 
human service organizations as part of their results.  
Among the 21 empirical studies reporting crowd-out, eight studies used data 
aggregated at the charity level such as the data on nonprofit revenues and expenses from 
federal tax returns filed by IRS Section 501(c)(3) organizations, known as Form 990. 
Four studies provided crowd-out effects using individual income tax return data, and nine 
reported crowd-out coefficients using surveys of charitable giving. For example, Kingma 
(1989), Andreoni and Payne (2008), and Dokko (2009) aggregated government funds and 
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private giving data from 990s. Andreoni and Payne (2008) found that total crowd-out of 
private giving is approximately 56 percent. 
Table 1. Summary of Empirical Studies of the Crowded-Out by Major Finding 
 
Data level 
Partial/Full 
crowd-out 
Partial/full  
crowd-in 
Both crowd-in 
and out 
No statistically 
significant 
relationship 
Using 
organizational- 
level data (e.g., 
Form 990s, 
charity 
information 
from the 
organization) 
Andreoni & Payne 
(2008), 
Brown & 
Finkelstein (2008), 
Dokko (2009), 
Gordon (2004), 
Gruber & 
Hungerman (2007), 
Hungerman (2009), 
Kingma (1989), 
Payne (1998)*  
Arulampalam, 
Backus, & 
Micklewright 
(2009, NUS), 
Borgonovi & 
O’Hare 
(2004), 
Heutel 
(2009)* 
Khanna & 
Sandler 
(2000, NUS), 
Smith (2007)  
Andreoni & 
Payne (2003)*, 
Borgonovi 
(2006)^,  
Brooks (2000b), 
Hersey (2010), 
Horne (2005)*, 
Okten & 
Weisbrod 
(2000), 
Smith (2006),  
Steinberg (1987) 
Brooks (1999, 
2003) 
Hughes & 
Luksetich 
(1999),  
Khanna, 
Posnett, & 
Sandler 
(1995, 
NUS)*, 
Payne (2001) 
Using 
aggregates of 
individual 
income tax 
return data  
Abrams & Schmitz 
(1978, 1984*) 
Amos (1982)* 
Steinberg (1990) 
 Schiff (1990*) Day & Devlin 
(1996, NUS), 
Lindsey & 
Steinberg 
(1990)* 
Using survey of 
giving data 
(e.g., charitable 
giving from 
individual 
donors) 
Cuellar (2004)*, 
Duncan (1999), 
Garrett and Rhine 
(2007) 
Hungerman (2005), 
Kingma & 
McClelland (1995), 
Ribar & Wilhelm 
(2002),  
Simmons & 
Emanuele (2004), 
Straub (2002), 
Steinberg (1985, 
NUS)* 
 Brooks 
(2000a)*^, 
Schiff (1985)* 
Reece 
(1979)* 
Note: - Studies are listed in alphabetical order within each type of data used.  
- Studies were categorized in both crowd-out and - in, if the study reports both crowd-out and –
in effects for different types of nonprofits or different levels of government funding.  
- NUS indicates non-US data. 
- * indicates that the study attempted to estimate crowd-out with human service organizations.  
- ^ indicates that the study reported a curvilinear relationship between government spending and 
donations 
- Andereoni and Payne (2003) examined the relationship between government spending and 
giving of fundraising for nonprofit organizations, not about donations.  
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Kingma (1989) found that a dollar of government funding increase crowded out 
53 cents of private giving to public radio stations. Dokko (2009) reported 50 to 60 cents 
crowd-out for art organizations. In addition, the following studies reported crowd-out 
interaction between government spending and private giving using organizational level 
data to aggregate charitable giving and government spending including Brown and 
Finkelstein (2008); Dokko (2009); Gordon (2004); Gruber and Hungerman (2007); 
Hungerman (2009); Kingma (1989); and Payne (1998). Consequently, the studies 
indicating crowd-out effect using an organizational level of data reported that a dollar of 
government funding to nonprofit organizations tends to result in the displacement of 
private giving between 14 and 60 cents.  
Researchers also provided crowd-out coefficients using different data sources 
(Abrams & Schmitz, 1978, 1894; Amos, 1982; Steinberg, 1990). Instead of using 990s, 
the studies used individual income tax return information through the National Bureau of 
Economic Research TAXSIM program which contained itemized deductions by income 
class. Those studies using individual income tax return data reported that a dollar of 
government funding to nonprofit organizations tends to crowd out private giving of 
between 4.6 and 46 cents.  
Furthermore, some studies used surveys of individual giving to obtain data on 
charitable giving and also noted crowd-out interaction of between government funds and 
private giving. For example, Simmons and Emanuele (2004) used a national sample of 
the activities of donors collected by the Gallup Organization and the Independent Sector, 
called Giving and Volunteering 1996 (Independent Sector 1996, as cited in Simmons & 
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Emanuele, 2004). They found minimal crowd out between government expenditures and 
the donation of time and money. Cuellar (2004) estimated crowd-out coefficient using the 
American Association of Fund-raising Counsel’s annual, Giving USA, and the various 
issues of the Statistical Abstracts of the United States for government expenditures. The 
following studies investigated crowd-out interaction using survey data at the 
organizational level: Duncan, 1999; Hungerman, 2005; Kingma & McClelland, 1995; 
Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002; Steinberg, 1985. The studies measuring individual philanthropic 
giving by surveys of recipient organizations found that a dollar increase in government 
expenditure tends to crowd out private giving to nonprofit organizations from a minimum 
of 2 cents to a maximum of 24 cents.   
In contrast, a few studies determined that government funding to nonprofit 
organizations tends to stimulate private giving. As indicated in Table 1, five studies 
reported a crowd-in pattern (Arulampalam et al., 2009; Borgonovi & O’Hare, 2004; 
Heutel, 2009; Khanna & Sandler, 2000; Smith, 2007). All five of these studies 
investigated the interaction using organizational level data. For example, Borgonovi and 
O’Hare (2004) addressed crowd-in of government spending for art organizations such as 
art museums, theaters, and art institutions using the National Endowment for the Arts 
(NET) and Form 990 data from the art organizations. Heutel (2009) reported a 
statistically significant crowd-in effect of government spending to six types of nonprofit 
organizations (e.g., food, agriculture, nutrition, and human service charities) using 990s. 
Khanna and Sandler (2000) found government spending crowded in voluntary donations 
using U.K. Charity Trends and U. K. Charity Statistics data, which contained detailed 
accounts of income and expenditures of charities in the U.K. In another U.K study, 
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Arulampalam, Backus, and Micklewright (2009) found a crowd-in effect with U.K. 
Charity Trends data, in which a dollar in government spending crowded in 15 cents in 
private donations.   
Other crowd-out studies have had mixed results. Eleven studies found mixed 
results based on the different types of nonprofit organizations (e.g., religious, health, and 
human service organizations) or different levels of government funds (e.g., federal funds 
vs. state funds, long-run government funds vs. short-run government funds). Among the 
11 studies, seven addressed the mixed coefficient using organizational level data 
(Borgonovi, 2006; Brooks, 2000b; Hersey, 2010; Horne, 2005; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; 
Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1987). Two studies using individual income tax return data found 
both crowd-out and –in effects (Andreoni & Payne, 2001; Schiff, 1990). Using a survey 
of private giving data, two studies reported government spending either crowded out or in 
private giving depending on the type of nonprofit organizations (Brooks, 2000a; Schiff, 
1985). 
Using 990s, Horne (2005) estimated the crowd-out effect between government 
spending and private donations to 15 different types of nonprofit organizations (such as 
art/culture/ humanities, education, universities, environment, human service, youth 
development, animal-related). He reported that in the nonprofit sector as a whole, a dollar 
of government sources crowded in five cents in charitable giving. However, the crowd-in 
did not uniformly predict the interaction. Nine subsectors demonstrated a crowd-in effect 
of government funds on charity (e.g., arts and culture, education, college/ university, 
environment, medical research, housing/shelter, public safety/disaster, youth 
development, and human service organizations); whereas five subsectors demonstrated a 
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crowd-out effect (e.g., animal-related, recreation/sport, international/ civil rights/ social 
action, community improvement organizations). Using 990s, Smith (2006) estimated the 
interaction between the NEA grants and non- NEA grants (e.g., private donations and 
state level government spending to art organizations). He reported that NEA grants 
crowded out private donations, but NEA grants crowded in state-level government 
spending.  
Some empirical studies found mixed effects using individual income tax return 
data. For example, Using the National Survey of Philanthropy 1974, a survey of some 
2,500 households, Schiff (1985) reported that charitable contributions fell as local 
governments’ funding increased. Specifically, he found that increases in certain types of 
government spending (e.g., cash transfers to the needy) crowded out donations, but 
increases in other types (e.g., spending on social services) stimulated charitable giving. 
Brooks (2000a) also studied the interaction using Giving USA data for charitable giving 
and U.S. Census data for government funds. He estimated the crowd-out effect for four 
different types of nonprofits (social and human service, health, arts and culture, and 
education organizations). He reported that a dollar in state government spending crowded 
out two cents in donations to social and human service organizations, while federal 
spending did not have a significant impact on private giving. Private giving to health 
organizations is crowded out by state spending, but is not statistically significantly 
affected by federal spending (Brooks, 2000a).  
Furthermore, some studies indicated a curvilinear pattern, with crowd-in at low 
levels of government support and crowd-out at a high level. For example, Brooks (2000b) 
reported that some orchestras will tend to experience a leveraging effect up to about 
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$8,200 in government support per concert; after this point, private support will begin to 
be crowded out. That is, Brooks (2000b) indicated a curvilinear relationship in which that 
lower level of government funding for symphony orchestra stimulated private giving, but 
higher government funding led to crowd-out. In another study using 990s, Hersey (2010) 
identified a curvilinear association between government spending and private giving.  
Finally, some studies reported no statistically significant relationship between 
government spending and private giving including Brooks (1999), Day and Devlin (1996), 
Hughes and Luksetich (1999), Khanna et al. (1995), Lindsey and Steinberg (1999), Okten 
and Weisbrod (2000), Payne (2001), and Reece (1979). For example, Brooks (1999) 
found no significant relationship for symphony orchestras. Hughes and Luksetich (1999) 
found federal government spending did not have a significant interaction with 
government spending and private giving to art museums.  
Several studies investigated the association between government welfare 
expenditures and private giving to human service organizations. Among 45 empirical 
studies, 15 addressed the interaction between government welfare expenditures and 
private giving to human service organizations as part of the analysis. The studies focusing 
specifically on human service organizations occasionally reported that state and local 
government spending crowded in private giving to human service organizations; and the 
studies found no significant association with the federal government spending. For 
example, Brooks (2000a) discovered one dollar in state government welfare expenditures 
crowded out two cents in private giving to human service organizations; while federal 
government welfare spending did not have a statistically significant association with 
private giving. In contrast, Schiff (1985, as cited in Steinberg, 1999) reported charitable 
42 
 
 
 
giving to social welfare charities increases when state and local government spending 
increases. Another study by Schiff (1985) reported that charitable giving to social welfare 
organizations fell as government cash transfers increased, but rose as other government 
welfare expenditures increased. Heutel (2009) found a crowd-in coefficient interaction 
between government spending and donations to human service organizations even though 
the size of the coefficient was the lowest statistically significant crowd-in rate. Andreoni 
and Payne (2001) also reported a significant positive relationship between government 
spending and fundraising efforts from human service organizations. Finally, Horne (2005) 
indicated a positive interaction between government spending and private giving to the 
human service sector by almost two cents.  
On the other hand, consistent negative coefficients were reported for the 
interaction between government welfare expenditures and charitable giving to human 
service organizations. Garrett and Rhine (2007) discovered a crowd-out coefficient 
between giving to welfare agencies and state and local welfare spending, though it was 
not statistically significant. Cuellar (2004) discovered a dollar increase in government 
welfare expenditures crowded out private contributions to human service organizations 
by almost five cents. Payne (1998) found government contributions to human service 
organizations crowded out about 53 cents of private giving to human service 
organizations. Finally, Steinberg (1985) reported a very small crowd-out effect, with only 
five cents displaced.  
For the last empirical study review, a few studies estimated the interaction 
between government spending and private giving using the joint crowd-out specification 
(Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1987, 1990, 1993). Steinberg (1990) indicated that using 
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aggregate government spending would result in biased crowding-out estimates, because 
state and local grants are endogenous and may change in response to a change in federal 
spending on nonprofits. Measuring the joint crowd-out model, Steinberg (1993) 
discovered that federal welfare spending had a statistically significantly positive effect on 
state spending on welfare, but partially crowded out charitable donations. That is, when 
state government spending remained constant, federal government spending crowded out 
4.6 cents of private giving, but if state government spending had not been allowed to 
respond to the change in federal grants, donations would have fallen by only 1.4 cents 
(Steinberg, 1993). Joint crowd-out has a much larger coefficient than simple crowd-out 
because state spending moves in the same direction as federal grants.  
As summarized, the empirical evidence concerning crowd-out between 
government spending and private giving is somewhat mixed: some were with crowd-out, 
some were with crowd-in, some were neither, and some were both crowd-out and –in. 
However, a majority of the studies indicated that government funding to nonprofit 
organizations crowds out private donations (e.g., Amos, 1982; Hughes & Luksetich, 1997; 
Khanna et al., 1995; Kingma, 1989; Payne, 1998; Schiff, 1990; Steinberg, 1985).
4
 
Nevertheless, some papers still supported a crowd-in effect (Borgonovi & O’Hare, 2004; 
Garrett & Rhine, 2007; Heutel, 2009; Khanna & Sandler, 2000). Furthermore, some 
studies stated a curvilinear relationship, which crowd-in at low levels of government 
support and crowd-out at high levels (Borgonovi, 2006; Brooks, 2000b; Hersey, 2010).  
                                           
4
 Brooks (2003) stated these seven economic studies were the major studies which conducted crowd-out 
effects from 1982 to 1998.  
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Even some studies estimated contradictory results measuring the same dataset.
5
 
Generally, empirical studies have reported partial crowd-out effect. However, certain 
studies examining the relationship with human service organizations were more likely to 
report crowd-in interaction between government welfare expenditures and private giving 
to human service organizations.  
Empirical Results: Limitations and Suggestions for Further Crowd-Out Study  
Empirical results about the interaction between government spending and 
private giving, researchers addressed the interaction in almost any way possible. 
Although a large number of studies of the government spending and private giving 
relationship do provide a strong foundation for this research, the analysis is far from 
finished because previous studies demonstrate important shortcomings. The main 
limitations are associated with the various data sources for the study, failure to estimate 
interactions, and sample size.   
First of all, researchers criticized crowd-out studies using aggregated data at the 
charity level (Horne, 2005; Payne, 2009; Tinkelman, 2009). Using organizational level 
data (e.g., tax return data, Form 990s) are not granular enough to allow comparison of 
government spending with private giving (Horne, Johnson, & Van Slyke, 2005; 
Tinkelman, 2009). According to Payne (2009), charity-level data cannot demonstrate the 
entire reaction by a donor to a change in government funding. For example, 
organizational level data cannot prove whether donors stopped giving to a charity 
                                           
5
 Borgonovi and O’Hare (2004), Dokko (2009), and Hughes & Luksetich (1999) estimated the interaction 
with the NEA data. Borgonovi and O’Hare (2004) reported crowd-in relationship; whereas, Dokko (2005) 
and Hughes and Luksetich (1999) indicated crowd-in effect. 
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because the charity received more government spending or they just stopped giving to 
that particular charity.  
The quality of charity level data also matters for two reasons: nonprofit 
organizations have different intentions when filling out the forms that reflect the charity’s 
revenue and expenditures; and the quality of charitable giving and government spending 
information is likely to be inaccurate because many nonprofits are run by volunteers. In 
addition, some types of government spending (e.g., tuition grants and Medicare) would 
likely be recorded in the organizational Form 990 as program service revenue rather than 
as federal or state government subsidies. In addition, Tinkelman (2009) stated that studies 
using tax return data on individual itemized charitable deductions cannot measure 
charitable giving from individual to particular causes such as giving to human service 
organizations. Furthermore, composite government spending using charity level data 
cannot be precise because public spending covers many different types of programs 
(Tinkelman, 2009). Therefore, the findings from the previous studies using organizational 
level data (e.g., Andreoni & Payne, 2008; Borgonovi & O’Hare, 2004; Brown & 
Finkelstein, 2008; Dokko, 2009; Heutel, 2009; Kingma, 1989; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; 
Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1987) are difficult to generalize to indicate the interaction 
between government spending and private giving.  
In contrast, a few studies used individual philanthropy data to address the 
relationship between government spending and private giving because of the inaccuracy 
of charitable giving information from organizational level data. For example, Schiff 
(1985) used 1974 data from the National Survey of Philanthropy, Day and Devlin (1996) 
used a Canadian survey from 1986 and 1987, Brooks (2003) and Garrett and Rhine (2007) 
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used charitable giving data from Giving USA. However, none of these empirical studies 
examined the interaction between government welfare expenditures and charitable giving 
to human service organizations using individual philanthropic data without endogeneity 
issues. Steinberg (1990) estimated the full set of interactions for social welfare charities. 
However, he used a proxy for individual donations (United Way allocations), whereas I 
used direct data on giving to people in need.  
In addition, the estimated individual charitable contributions had reliability and 
validity issues even though a few studies used individual philanthropic giving datasets. 
That is, the survey methodology of charitable giving studies had been an issue for 
researchers. For example, in November 2000, the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
University assembled a group of leading researchers in philanthropy studies. Six 
scholarly papers—Havens and Schervish (2001), Hall (2001), Kennedy and Vargus 
(2001), Kirsch, McCormack, and Saxon-Harrold (2001), O’Neil (2001), Rooney, 
Steinberg, and Schervish (2001) — were prepared for a conference and addressed 
methodological issues in surveying giving and volunteering behavior. In the results, 
researchers emphasized the limitations of existing individual giving data such as response 
rates, oversamples, questionnaire design, respondent selection, and unit of analysis. In 
regard to improving surveys of charitable giving, researchers recommended these points: 
interviewers should sample households across the complete spectrum of income; 
interviewees should be the household member who knows the most about the household’s 
giving; interviewers should be well-trained; interviewers must use a variety of prompts to 
aid respondents’ recall; and interviewers should inquire about a broad range of 
information about voluntary giving (Havens & Schervish, 2001; O’Neil, 2001). 
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Another downside of previous studies is associated with the estimated results 
with simple OLS estimation (Payne, 2009; Smith, 2006; Steinberg, 1987, 1993; 
Tinkelman, 2009). Simple OLS estimation has been employed in many studies. However, 
some researchers stated that estimated coefficients of government spending and private 
giving with simple OLS equation are biased and inconsistent (Kingma, 1989; Smith, 
2006; Steinberg, 1987). For example, Seaman (1980, as cited in Tinkelman, 2009) found 
simple OLS tended to overestimate the crowd-out effects while comparing simultaneous 
equations model to OLS models.  
Similarly, Payne (1998) found significantly different results with 2SLS, which is 
an alternative to OLS designed to estimate endogeneity bias. After Payne (1998) raised 
the endogeneity and omitted-variable issues about the results from previous studies with 
simple OLS models, some researchers examined crowd out using 2SLS specification (e.g., 
Brooks, 1999; Dokko, 2009; Gruber & Hungerman, 2007; Hungerman, 2005; Payne, 
1998) or lagged variables (Horne, 2005).  
Other researchers argued that the possibility that the interaction between 
government spending and private giving changes by different levels or types of 
government funding. The vast majority of empirical studies posited either a simple linear 
or a log-linear relationship between government spending and private giving. However, 
researchers asserted both the level of government spending (e.g., federal or state 
government spending) and the length of government spending (e.g., long term or short 
term) should be considered to estimate the interaction (Borgonovi, 2006; Brooks, 2000b; 
Steinberg, 1990, 1993; Tinkelman, 2009). For example, Borgonovi (2006) and Brooks 
(2000b) stated that crowd-out effect should be estimated by distinguishing lower or 
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higher level of government spending. Steinberg (1990) asserted federal government 
spending and state government spending should be distinguished to estimate the crowd-
out effect. Also, he estimated the total effect of the relationship between government 
spending and private giving because both state or local government and individual donors 
would react if federal government expenditures to a state or local government were 
changed.  
In summary, prior studies have had insufficient data to compare the interaction 
between government spending and private giving. That is, using organizational level data 
is not granular enough to estimate the interaction because of incompleteness and 
inaccuracy of the reported data about government spending and private giving. For data 
analysis with aggregated data, the estimated coefficient with the sophisticated technique 
(simple OLS) was biased and inconsistent. Also, the relation between government 
spending and private giving is not a linear relationship.  
Thus, researchers recommended some alternative methods to avoid the biased 
coefficient problem. For example, in order to deflect endogeneity and omitted-variable 
bias, some researchers addressed crowd-out effects with different statistical analysis (e.g., 
2SLS) specification instead of using OLS or considering instrument variable techniques 
including, Payne (1998), Hungerman (2005), Gruber and Hungerman (2007), and Dokko 
(2009). Other researchers used joint crowd-out to avoid those problems (Kingma, 1989, 
Smith, 2006, Steinberg, 1987, 1990, 1993). 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
In this chapter, conceptual definitions of key variables are given such as the 
definition of charitable giving to human service organizations and other control variables. 
Data resources, research equations, and data analysis are addressed.   
Data Sources  
The data used in this study to analyze the interaction between government 
welfare expenditures and private giving to human service organizations came from two 
separate sources: the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) and the U.S. Census 
datasets. The data on individual philanthropic giving to human service organizations were 
taken from the COPPS dataset. COPPS is a module of the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics (PSID), the nation’s first and only ongoing longitudinal study about charitable 
giving over time.
6
  
Steinberg and Wilhelm (2003) highlighted the advantages of using the COPPS 
dataset. Particularly, they accent that the COPPS dataset contains high-quality contextual 
data including income, wealth, work hours, wages, health, family structure, and other 
demographic data. While considering the recommendations from the conference for the 
survey methodology of charitable giving study hosted by the Center on Philanthropy at 
Indiana University in 2000, Steinberg and Wilhelm (2003) and Wilhelm (2002) stated 
that among the existing philanthropy datasets in the U.S., the COPPS dataset most 
accurately estimates individual charitable giving. As follow up studies, the two papers by 
                                           
6
 PSID is fielded by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and has surveyed the 
dynamic and interactive aspects of family economic, demographic, health, and philanthropy from the 
nationally representative same households since 1968. In 2001, Indiana University added the philanthropic 
component in the PSID survey and has been accumulating data on philanthropic giving behavior every two 
years. The COPPS contains not only comprehensive, nationally representative data on charitable giving, but 
also solely encloses panel data on giving in the United States. 
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Wilhelm (2006, 2007) speak to the quality of the COPPS data, showing that COPPS has a 
far lower item-nonresponse rate than other giving surveys and that reported levels of 
giving track those in the “gold standard” cross-sectional study (the 1974 National Survey 
of Philanthropy) very well up to the 90th percentile of the income distribution.  
For this study, the 2007 wave of COPPS dataset was used to aggregate the 
charitable giving to human service organizations.
7
 The philanthropic questions were 
asked in 2007 about giving in 2006. Finally, a total of 8,289 households participated in 
the 2007 wave of the PSID and 8,110 households answered the philanthropy section. The 
family weights that are provided by the PSID research team at the University of Michigan 
to yield nationally representative results is used to estimate the charitable giving to 
human service organizations. The PSID research team provides the family weight 
variable because of the oversampling issue. In this study, the family weight variable is 
applied in the regression.
8
 
For estimating philanthropic giving information, the COPPS survey covered 
philanthropic giving to charity with eleven different types of nonprofit organizations 
including the following: religious, arts and culture, combined purposes, education, 
environment and animal-related, helping people in need, health, international, 
neighborhood and community, youth and family, and other organizations.  
For estimating total amount of charitable giving to human service organizations, 
the estimated dollar amount of philanthropic giving to human service organizations was 
                                           
7
 The COPPS 2007 data is available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Research/copps/ 
#dataSets. This data set was generated from the raw data with some cleaning explained in the user’s manual 
at the same site.  
8
 The oversampling issue does not discussed in this paper and weights get at additional things, like attrition 
bias, as well as the initial oversample in the SEO portion of the data. 
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transferred as dollar per capita in order to examine the joint crowd-out effects. In order to 
estimate the per capita dollar amount of charitable giving to human service organizations, 
the estimated total amount of charitable giving to human service organizations was 
divided by the total number of family members per household.
9
 In addition, the 
estimated per capita dollar amount of charitable donations to human service organizations 
was adjusted for inflation in order to estimate the size of the coefficient of joint crowd-
out effect in constant dollars, using the CPI to adjust for inflation.  
Individual levels of socio-economic demographic variables were taken from the 
COPPS 2007, including household’s age, gender, education level, ethnicity, marital status, 
religion, employment status, heath condition, number of kids, wealth, and income. In 
addition, the price of giving data was generated using COPPS 2007 by Wilhelm and Han 
(2012).  
The data on federal and state government welfare expenditures in FY 2005 were 
taken from various sources of the U.S. Census datasets. First of all, the federal 
expenditures on public welfare in 2005 were taken from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The data were released in February 2007.
10
 The state 
and local government expenditures on public welfare were taken from the U.S. Census 
database that was generated by the Public Policy Institute (PPI). The PPI provided state 
and local per-capita public welfare spending in 2005 that was generated based on Census 
                                           
9
 The total number of family size was generated as follows: One person was added to the total number of 
children who are living with a household who is single, widowed, or separated. Two persons were added to 
the total number of children when a household was married in COPPS 2007. 
10 
The federal government expenditures to state government for public welfare were retrieved from the 
Knowledge Center at the Council of States Governments  
(http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/2.3.pdf) 
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Bureau State and Local Government Finances.
11
 Both federal government funds for 
public welfare programs to state and the state and local government expenditures for 
public welfare were estimated by a dollar per capita. The detailed federal and state 
government spending on public welfare in 2005 listed in Appendix A. Additionally, state 
levels of socio-economic characteristics were taken from the U.S. Census database as 
well.  
Conceptual Definitions of Key Variables 
In this study, charitable giving to human service organizations was identified as 
giving to people in need and giving to youth and family organizations. The Panel Study 
Income Dynamic (PSID, 2010) defines philanthropic giving to people in needs as 
charitable giving to organizations that help people in need of food, shelter or other basic 
necessities. The conceptual definition of giving to youth and family organizations is the 
donation to organizations that provide youth or family services, such as to scouting, boy’s 
and girls’ clubs, Big Brothers and Sisters, foster care, or family counseling. Based on 
these conceptual definitions of charitable giving to human service organizations, the total 
amount of giving to human service organizations was estimated by the sum of these two 
types of giving. Although, the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) estimates 
twelve different types of charitable giving—particularly, the COPPS estimates the giving 
to organizations for combined purposes— the giving for combined purposes did not 
include the estimate of total contributions to human service organizations in this study.
12
 
Because the organizations for people in need and the organizations for youth and family 
                                           
11 
The State welfare government expenditures were retrieved from the Public Policy Institute of New York 
State, Inc. (http://www.ppinys.org/reports/jtf/welfarespending.htm) 
12
 Charities that provide for combined purposes include the United Way, the Catholic Charities, the United 
Jewish Appeal, community foundations, and private foundations (PSID, 2010).  
53 
 
 
 
are on the front line these organizations provide direct benefits and services to people in 
need.  
For data analysis, the estimated charitable giving to human service organizations 
was transformed as dollar per capita in this study in order to put government spending 
and donations on the same scale. Originally the COPPS data does report each household’s 
giving as current dollar amount. In order to generate the dollar per-capita donations to 
human service organizations, the estimated total household giving was divided by the 
family members in each household in the 2007 COPPS.  
The conceptual definition of government welfare expenditures was identified as 
the federal or state/ local government expenditures for public welfare, including federal 
assistance programs, cash assistance programs, and other public aid programs. According 
to the Government Finance and Employment Classification Manual (U.S. Census, 
1/12/2012), public welfare expenditures include the following: Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medical Assistance 
Program (Medicaid), food stamps, and other public aid expenditures. Table 2 provides a 
detailed description of the welfare expenditures of the public welfare section. The 
government spending on public welfare measure is the sum of all the expenditures listed 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2. A Description of Public Welfare Program  
Category Definition 
Federal 
Categorical 
Assistance 
Programs 
The expenditures associated with three federal programs 
- Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
- Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  
- Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid). 
Other Cash 
Assistance 
Programs 
Cash payments made directly to individuals contingent upon their 
need, other than those under federal categorical assistance 
programs (e.g., poor relief; general relief; home relief; emergency 
relief; general assistance; refugee assistance; medical assistance, 
housing expense relief, energy assistance; Home Energy 
Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, emergency assistance).  
Vendor 
Payments 
for Medical 
Care 
Public welfare payments made directly to private vendors for 
medical assistance and hospital or health care, including Medicaid 
(Title XIX), plus mandatory state payments to the federal 
government to offset costs of prescription drugs under Medicare 
Part D. Payments to vendors or the federal government must be 
made on behalf of low-income or means-tested beneficiaries, or 
other medically qualified persons. 
Vendor 
payments 
for other 
purposes 
Payments under public welfare programs made directly to private 
vendors (i.e., individuals or nongovernmental organizations 
furnishing goods and services) for services and commodities, 
other than medical, hospital, and health care, on behalf of low-
income or other means-tested beneficiaries. 
Institutions 
Provision, construction, and maintenance of nursing homes and 
welfare institutions owned and operated by a government for the 
benefit of needy persons (contingent upon their financial or 
medical need), and veterans. 
Other 
welfare 
expenditures  
All expenditures for welfare activities not classified elsewhere 
(e.g., regulation of private welfare activities; children’s services, 
such as foster care, adoption, day care, nonresidential shelters, 
and the like; social services for the physically disabled, such as 
transportation; low-income energy assistance and weatherization 
intergovernmental payments; temporary shelters and other 
services for the homeless; welfare-related community action 
programs). 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (n.d.). Government Finance and Employment Classification 
Manual: Covering the activities of the Federal, state, and local governments. 
In addition, the other control variables, measured at the state level, were taken 
from the U.S. Census database, including poverty rate, state median household income, 
percentage of population who are 65 years or over in the state, and the percentage of state 
level owner occupied houses. As for exogenous variables that significantly affect the 
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determinants of charitable donation, Andreoni and Payne (2008), Cuellar (2004), Schiff 
(1985), and Straub (2002) stated that the changes in charitable donations were 
significantly associated with those three state-level control variables.  
First of all, the percentage of poverty level is included because previous studies 
(e.g., Andreoni & Payne, 2008; Cuellar, 2005) have found the poverty level to be 
significant determinants of donations. The state income is a significant factor in 
estimating the relationship between federal government spending and private giving to 
human service organizations. Cuellar (2004) and Straub (2002) stated that family income 
has a significant and positive effect on charitable contribution.  
In this study, the measure of state income was estimated as per-capita median 
family income by state. The percent of population over 65 years old and the percent of 
housing units in a state that are owner occupied were important variables that have a 
significant impact on the relationship between government spending and private giving. 
According to Steinberg (1988), the percent of population over 65 years old has positive 
effects on charitable giving. That is, the higher the percentage of population who are 65 
years or more, the more likely they are to donate more to charity. The positive association 
between age and giving has been repeatedly reported in philanthropic studies (Andreoni, 
2006; White, 1989).  
In contrast, the percentage of occupied housing units that are owner-occupied is 
anticipated to have a negative effect. Steinberg (1988) noted that a higher percentage of 
occupied housing rate affects the needs for charitable donations; thus, charitable giving 
would not be necessary. Therefore, the percentage of occupied housing units would 
negatively affect charitable giving. However, the effect is possible in the other direction. 
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Based on the empirical suggestion from previous studies, the writer included those four 
state level variables as independent variables in this study to estimate the crowd-out 
coefficient.  
In addition, a variety of socio-economic variables were included in the long 
version of the reduced-form equation in order to estimate an accurate coefficient without 
bias. The differences in household demographics included price of giving, gender, 
education level, ethnicity, marital status, number of children, health condition, religion, 
employment status, wealth without house, and income. 
In particular, the price of giving was examined in the regression equation 
because the price of giving generally affects charitable donation. In general, higher 
marginal tax rates reduce the cost of giving (price of giving), then the lower price of 
giving induces more charitable giving. That is, the price of giving has a negative 
association with charitable giving. The impact of the price of giving on charitable giving 
has been explained in several studies. For example, Clotfelter (1985, as cited in Cuellar, 
2004) noted that donors were generally sensitive to variations in tax rates. Thus, the price 
of the giving is exogenous to the decision of how much to contribute. The price of the 
giving variable was included to estimate the crowd-out effect in Schiff (1985) and has 
been indicated in crowd-out studies ( Cuellar, 2004; Kingma, 1989; Straub, 2002).  
The conceptual understanding about price of giving is that the estimated 
charitable giving amount is the amount of after-tax income which must be dedicated to 
transfer a dollar to charity. For example, the price is one dollar for non-itemizers and 
dollars (from 1$ 1 to $m), where m is the donor’s marginal tax rate. Cash donations that 
made by living individuals not subject to the alternative minimum tax to eligible charities, 
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amounting less than 50 percent of adjusted gross income computed without any net 
operating loss carrybacks. PSID data which is original sour of COPPS data, does not 
report tax information in detail, especially the PSID does not survey the actual marginal 
tax rate. Wilhelm and Han (2012) were able to generate the price of giving from a set of 
input variables tailored to tax-return data using the NBER’s TAXSIM program. Wilhelm 
and Han (2012) addressed that the generated price of giving variable is appropriate to use 
in PSID data, even though PSID data does not fit the bill precisely.  
For the simple state crowd-out equation, the independent variables were 
included as follows: federal government public welfare expenditures in 2005, the state 
poverty rate, the state median income, the percentage of total population who are 65 and 
over, and the percentage of occupied housing units in the state.  
Descriptive Statistics of Government Spending and Charitable Giving 
As shown in Table 3, COPPS 2007 shows that 65.5 percent of all U.S. 
households donated to charity in 2006. Specifically, 35.2 percent of donor households 
contributed to human service organizations in 2006. For charitable donor households only, 
the median total amount of giving to charity was $870 (average $2,213). The median gift 
to human service organizations was $200 (average $500). For charitable giving including 
non-donor households, the median total amount of giving to charity was $301(average 
$1,449). The median gift to human service organizations including non-donors was $0 
(average $164) . Other charitable donors’ socio-demographic characteristics such as 
gender, education level, ethnicity, marital status, religiosity, and income are shown in 
detail in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Overview of Charitable Giving in 2006 
Category 
Giving 
Rate 
Average amount  
per household 
Median amount  
per household 
Overall Giving 65.5% $2,213(*$1,449 ) $870 (*$301) 
Human Services 
Giving 
35.2% $500(*$164) $200(*$0) 
Category Percentage Category Percentage 
 
Probability of  
overall giving 
65.5% Catholic 30.0% 
 
Probability of  
human service giving 
35.2% Jewish 4.1% 
 
Female 28.95% Protestant 64.0% 
 
Male 71.05% Other non-Christian 1.5% 
 
High school or less 42.2% Orthodox 0.4% 
 
College attendees 30.2% Others 2.1% 
 
Bachelor degree 20.2% Itemizer 58.9% 
 
Master/PhD degree 7.4% Non-itemizer 41.1% 
 
White 74.0% Working now 63.4% 
 
Black 13.6% Unemployed 4.1% 
 
Asian or 
pacific islander 
1.75% Retired 19.0% 
 
Hispanic or Latino 7.9% Disabled 4.7% 
 
Other race 2.8% Other 8.8% 
 
Health 
condition 
Excellent  20.6% Category 
Average 
(Median) 
SD 
Very good  34.3% 
Number of Children 0.6 (0) 1.02 
Good  28.7% 
Fair  11.6% 
Income in 2004 
$70,951 
($49,770) 
93546.7 
Poor 4.8% 
Married 49.7% 
Wealth 
(exclude house values) 
$267,742 
($24,200) 
1455517 
Never married 22.4% Total giving amount 
$2,213 
($870) 
4238.8 
Widowed 9.1% 
Human services giving 
amount 
$500 
($200) 
963.2 
Divorced 15.7% 
State & local 
expenditure in 2005 
$1,237 
 
Separated 3.1% 
Federal expenditure  
in 2005 
$173.7 
 
 
Average state income  
in 2005 
$34.484 
 
Poverty level in 2005 12.9% 
 
Note: -Percentage of each socio-demographic variable was estimated after weighted with family  
weight 2007 variable. Also, the responding households who did not respond on philanthropic section 
were excluded to estimate the socio-demographic characteristics and philanthropic behavior.  
-Private giving to HSOs and total giving amount were estimated with $ per year in 2006 dollar.  
-Federal, state, and local government spending on public welfare in 2005 were estimated with $ per capita. 
* The estimated dollar amounts including both donor and non-donors.    
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According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the federal government 
provided overall $173.7 per capita for public welfare in 2005. The federal government 
paid out approximately $622.6 per capita to California state and local governments for 
public welfare which was the largest amount of grants in 2005, followed by New York 
state ($518.1 per capita), Michigan ($221.0 per capita), and Colorado ($216.1). In 
addition, the state and local government expenditures on public welfare were an average 
of $1,237 per capita in 2006. In 2005, New York state paid out for public welfare almost 
$2,236 per capita in 2005, which was the largest amount of grants among the 50 states, 
followed by Alaska ($2,085), and Rhode Island ($2,014). In contrast, the Nevada state 
government paid out $718 per capita for public welfare in 2005, which was the smallest 
amount among the 50 states, following by Colorado ($738) and Texas ($866). The 
detailed information is stated in the Appendix D.  
Results of the crowd-out effect of federal government expenditures on charitable 
donations to human service organizations were mixed. The detailed results from all 
regression analyses are summarized in Appendix A.  
Econometric Specification 
The joint crowd-out estimation was outlined by Steinberg (1987) and has been 
presented recently in Cuellar (2004) and Smith (2006). In the Steinberg model (1987), the 
joint crowd-out model was developed based on the assumption that federal government 
transfers to state governments are exogenous. The exogenous change in federal 
government spending would lead to the changes in state government expenditures 
(simple government crowd-out). The exogenous change in federal government spending 
also leads to changes in donations in the state (simple donation crowd-out). In turn, state 
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government spending responds to induced changes in donations, and the combined effect 
of these two factors on state government spending is called joint government crowd-out. 
That is:  
    
       
 
    
       
 
         
       
 
    
         
 
Donations respond both to the original federal grant and the induced change in state 
government spending, and the combined effect is called joint crowd-out of donation. The 
correct structural form equations are as follows:  
                                           ε  
                                      ε  
Where:  
      is per person giving in household i in state s,  
        denotes the per capita federal government welfare spending  
in state s in 2005 
          indicates the per capita state government welfare spending  
in state s in 2005, 
   is all the state level control variables and is a vector as    
   denotes individual i’s socio-demographic characteristics as individual 
specific control variables   
The reduced form of this structural model is: 
      =                            
          =                        
The key identifying restrictions are that the donor cares only about total government 
spending, and the state government cares only about donations plus federal grants. 
      entifies joint crowd-out of donations and    identifies joint crowd-out of stage 
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government spending on public welfare. The simple crowd-out coefficient is estimated by 
the joint crowd-out of donations parameter (    and the joint crowd-out of state 
government expenditures (  ). The implied parameter for simple crowd-out of donations 
is          . In this study, the reduced forms were examined in order to estimate the 
coefficient of joint crowd-out.  
Estimation Technique: Tobit Specification and OLS 
To identify the total effects of federal spending changes on state spending and 
private donations, three relationships were examined. First, this paper examined the joint 
crowd-out of donations while controlled without interruption. Second, the joint crowd-out 
of state spending was tested. Third, the simple crowd-out of donations is estimated based 
on the coefficients of the joint crowd-out of donation and the joint crowd-out of 
government spending while holding other variables constants.  
In detail, first of all, the Tobit model is used to estimate the joint crowd-out 
coefficient between charitable giving to human service organizations and federal 
spending. The estimated coefficient with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is 
inconsistent if a dependent variable has a number of its values clustered at a limiting 
value, usually zero. Greene (1999) stated that censoring issue can be leaded when a data 
is incompletely observed. That is, when data on the dependent variable is limited but not 
data on the repressors, censoring issue are occurred. COPPS data contains censoring issue 
because many households reported giving no money to charity in 2006. The Tobit model 
is an applicable analysis method to eliminate the censoring error, even though the Tobit 
model does not diminish the problem. However, the Tobit estimator’s consistency rests 
only if conditional moment test of the homoscedasticity and normality assumptions are 
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conducted. According to Wilhelm (2006), although PSID data does not fulfill the 
homoscedasticity and normality assumption, the Tobit estimates are numerically similar 
to the estimates by more advanced and statistically consistent methods such as 
symmetrically censored least squares (SCLS) or censored least absolute deviations 
(CLAD). Thus, I examined the total effect of federal government welfare spending on 
state government welfare spending and charitable giving to human service organizations 
in this study (joint crowd-out of donations) with the Tobit model.  
In addition, the Tobit regression results were interpreted with a margin which 
was predicted Y* is greater than zero with calculated numeric derivatives and integrals 
(dydx) because the raw Tobit coefficients are not directly useful, as they indicate the 
effect of an increase in the covariate on a fictional donations variable that can take 
negative values. Instead, I report the average unconditional marginal effect of each 
continuous covariate on actual donations in Table 4 blow. This unconditional marginal 
effect incorporates expected contributions from those who do not donate prior to the 
increase in the covariate as well as increases in contributions from those who donate 
regardless. For dichotomous variables, I report the expected unconditional effect on 
donations when the covariate changes from 0 to 1.  
Second, the joint crowd-out coefficient between state spending and federal 
spending was employed with OLS with robust error. The Tobit model was not attempted 
for this regression because state and federal government expenditures did not have a 
censoring problem. Robust standard error is used because standard error estimates of 
commonly applied covariance matrix estimation techniques are biased. Robust standard 
error improves the statistical efficiency of the coefficient estimates. King and Robert 
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(2012) reported more than 50,600 articles using robust standard error across all academic 
fields. Thus, robust standard error can estimate the joint crowd-out of government 
spending on public welfare actuality.  
Finally, the simple crowd-out of donations was estimated using a simple 
function of the reduced-form coefficients. Steinberg (1993) noted that the coefficient of 
simple crowd-out of donations is able to be estimated by the parameter, the estimated 
coefficient of joint crowd-out of donations divided by the coefficient of joint crowd-out 
of government spending plus 1. This approach was used by Lindsey and Steinberg (1990), 
Schiff and Steinberg (1988), and Steinberg (1985, 1993).  
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Chapter Four: Results 
Crowd-Out Estimations 
 
The joint crowd-out of donations was directly revealed by the coefficient on 
federal spending in the reduced-form estimation. As shown in Table 4, the result on the 
joint crowd-out effect of donations suggests that the federal government expenditure on 
public welfare crowds out $0.051 per capita in private contributions to human service 
organizations while holding state spending constant in the donations but the estimate is 
not statistically significant. That is, the result indicates that when a dollar per capita of 
federal government spending on public welfare is increased, 5.1 cents per capita of 
charitable donations to human service organizations would be decreased. The full results 
are stated in Appendix A.   
Table 4. Joint Crowd-Out of Donations  
Independent Variables Tobit Analysis 
Tobit analysis 
(with a new philanthropy giving) 
Federal spending -0.051(0.041) -0.0313(0.0228) ^ 
State income 0.0009(0.001) -0.0013(0.010) ^ 
State poverty rate -1.372(1.784) -13.103(13.091) ^ 
Price of giving -1.849(0.318)*** -25.150(3.620)*** ^  
State age 65 or more -2.570(1.641) -27.862(11.545) ^  
State owner occupied house -0.521(0.260) 1.410(7.028) ^ 
Total sample 6,629 6,629 
-Dollar amount was estimated in a dollar per-capita. 
- Dollar amount was adjusted for inflation in 2005 dollar value.  
- Delta method standard errors are in parenthesis. 
- The estimated coefficients are the estimated average marginal effect with respect to observable 
donations. 
- The reported coefficients are the average incremental effect on observable giving relative to the 
excluded category.  
- The reported coefficient for price of giving is an elasticity form. 
- The estimated coefficients for the control variables are not displayed in this table. 
- ^ additional joint crowd out coefficients with extended charitable giving to HSOs, including religious 
giving, combination giving, needy giving, youth and family giving 
***P<0.001, **P<0.05, * P<0.10 
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Although crowd-out is not statistically significantly different from zero, it is 
very significantly different from negative 1. Thus, we can confidently reject the 
hypothesis that joint crowd-out of donations is dollar for dollar. A 99% confidence 
interval has an upper limit of around 17 cents. Thus, the crowd-in effect cannot be 
rejected, but whether crowd-out or crowd-in, the magnitude is small. This result of the 
joint crowd-out is similar to those obtained by other empirical studies. For example, 
Schiff and Steinberg (1988) reported approximately 3.3 cents of joint crowd-out in social 
welfare donations. Lindsey and Steinberg (1990) found 4.6 cents of joint crowd-out in 
donations to social services.  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 4, additional estimations for the joint crowd-out 
of donations was attempted to explore the robustness of the conclusion to alternative 
measures of donations. The joint crowd-out effect was tested with a new philanthropic 
giving variable.
13
 The results with extended charitable giving information indicates that a 
dollar per capita of federal grants to public welfare crowds out 3.13 cents per capita of 
private donations, but statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.171).  
The joint crowd-out effects of federal government expenditures on state and 
local level spending on public welfare (joint crowd-out of government spending) is 
revealed by the coefficient on federal spending in the reduced-form state spending 
equation. The coefficient of joint crowd-out of government spending is estimated while 
subtracting 1 from the coefficient in the state spending equation to avoid double counting. 
The results are presented in Table 5. The estimated coefficient of joint crowd-out of 
                                           
13
 A new philanthropic giving to human service organizations for the stacked regression was generated 
with the charitable giving not only to people in need and youth and family giving, but also to religious 
organization (the organizations for religious and combination giving (the organizations for multi-functional 
purposes such as Catholic Charities and the United Way). 
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government spending is 0.409, which is the coefficient with total state government 
spending. In order to avoid double counting, the coefficient of joint crowd-out of 
government spending was subtracted 1 from the coefficient— the former is 0.409 – 1, 
which is (-0.591). Therefore, the result of the OLS regression suggests that federal 
government expenditure on public welfare crowds out 59.1 cents per capita in total state 
government spending on public welfare. However, as is true for the joint crowd-out of 
government spending, the estimate is not statistically significant. That is, when federal 
government spending on public welfare is increased by a dollar capital, approximately 
59.1 cents per capita of state government expenditures on public welfare would be 
decreased but statistically insignificant.
14
  
Table 5. Joint Crowd-Out of State Spending (Including Fixed Effects Panel Estimator) 
Independent Variables OLS Analysis Fixed-Effects 
Federal spending 0.409(0.553) 0.083(0.772) 
State income 0.0186(0.013) 0.059(0.013) 
State poverty rate 7.184(20.223) 14.065(33.010) 
State age 65 or more 32.403(51.667) -1.126(231.83) 
State owner occupied house -3.749(2.610) -21.141(31.647) 
Total sample 50 100 
- Dollar amount was estimated in a dollar per-capita.  
- Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
- The state government spending is total state government spending on public welfare.  
***P<0.001, **P<0.05, * P<0.10 
 
 
The joint crowd-out of government spending results was not statistically 
significant because of few observations. With only 50 observations for this dependent 
variable, it is not surprising that the covariates are generally insignificant. To see the 
                                           
14
 The estimated coefficient of joint crowd-out of government spending was inconsistent with flypaper 
effect which reports that own-financed state spending goes up when federal grant goes up. However, the 
result was not significant because the estimated joint crowd-out of government spending was statistically 
insignificant.  
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effect of sample size on estimates, the information of government expenditures on public 
welfare in 2003 was added and tried variants. First, the stacked regression was examined 
while adding more government spending observations to the data because it is more 
robust to measurement error bias with more samples. Then a fixed-effect panel estimator 
was attempted to estimate the joint crowd-out of government spending. The fixed-effect 
panel estimator is usually more persuasive than OLS for panel data because it is more 
robust to exclude “omitted variable bias.” As shown in Table 5, the result of fixed-effects 
estimator indicates a smaller coefficient of crowd-out effect, but was statistically 
insignificant (59.1 cents with OLS vs. 91.7 cents with fixed-effects).
15
  
The simple crowd-out of donations was estimated in this study after inferring the 
parameters from the reduced-form estimates for the joint crowd-out of donations and the 
joint crowd-out of government spending. According to Steinberg (1993), under the 
identifying assumption that simple crowding out of donations by federal grants is equal to 
simple crowding out of donations by state government expenditures, the parameter of 
simple crowd-out can be identified as quotients of reduced-form parameters.
16
  
The result of simple donations crowd-out suggested that government 
expenditures on public welfare crowded out approximately 3.56 cents per capita of 
private charity to human service organizations. That is, if state spending had not been 
allowed to respond to the change in federal grants, private donations to human service 
organizations would have fallen by only 3.56 cents per capita. In addition, the 
approximate 95% confidence interval for simple crowd-out ranges from 44.68 cents to 
crowd-in 9.99 cent. While this is a wide range and so simple crowd-out cannot be 
                                           
15
 The former with fixed-effect panel estimator was 0.083 – 1 = -0.917. 
16
 In particular, the implied simple crowd-out of donations parameter is            
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confidential signed. The results can confidentially reject the hypothesis of Warr (1982) 
and Roberts (1984) that simple crowd-out is 100 percent.
17
  
The negative simple crowd-out effects between government spending and 
private giving have been probed in previous studies. Amos (1985), Schiff (1990), 
Steinberg (1985), and Payne (1998) reported the crowd-out coefficient with the federal 
level of expenditures to social welfare. In detail, Amos (1982) found a crowd-out of 46 
cents in private donations. Payne (1998) discovered crowd-out of 53 cents, while Schiff 
(1990) found crowd-out of 40 cents. Steinberg (1985) found very small crowd-out effects 
(only 5 cents). The estimates from Amos, Payne, Schiff, and Steinberg’s study were 
statistically significant. Other studies, such as Lindsey and Steinberg (1990) and Reece 
(1979), discovered the crowd-out effect with federal spending on social welfare, but the 
estimations were statistically insignificant. Overall, Brooks (2005) summarized that 
empirical crowd-out studies reported an average of $0.36 crowd-out in donations to 
social welfare organizations. Compared to empirical studies, in this study, a much smaller 
joint crowd-out effect was observed, with only 4.9 cents displaced, similar to the result 
by Steinberg (1985).  
In addition, compared to the size of simple crowd-out and the joint crowd-out, 
the size of the simple crowd-out of donations was smaller than the joint crowd-out (3.6 
cents per capita vs. 5.1 cents per capita). The joint crowd-out is larger than simple crowd-
out because state spending moves in simple direction as federal grants. That is, when 
federal spending increases, state spending increases because the state receives more 
                                           
17
 Because the simple crowd-out parameter is the ratio of two estimated asymptotically normal coefficient. 
It is Cauchy-distributed, and the t-distribution gives the wrong significance levels. Rather than report the 
exact significance level, which required approximation, I construct an empirical confidence interval from 
the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for the joint crowd-out of donations and state spending 
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grants from the federal government. Lindsey and Steinberg (1990) found simple crowd-
out of 1.4 cents and joint crowd-out of 4.6 cents. Based on both studies, it is clear that the 
estimated coefficient of joint crowd-out is larger than the estimated coefficient of simple 
crowd-out.  
Other Economic and Socio-Demographic Variables 
The estimated coefficient between charitable giving to human service 
organizations and other independent variables are shown in detail in Appendix A. Higher 
state per capita income has a very small positive impact on charitable donations to human 
service organizations, but the estimate is not significant. That is, as per capita income is 
increased by a dollar, an approximately 0.09 cent per capita of donations to human 
service organizations is increased. A higher percentage of state level poverty has a 
negative but insignificant impact on private donations.  
The price of giving has a negative impact on private giving to human service 
organizations. The estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001). That is, the result of the 
price of giving indicates that the price elasticity is -2.15, implying that a one percent 
increase in the price of giving causes a 2.15 percent decrease in the amount donated 
p<0.001). The negative impact of the price of giving on charitable donations has been 
reported in previous studies. For example, Smith (2006) reported a negative but 
insignificant impact of the price variable on donation. Schiff (1985) discovered a higher 
coefficient of the price of giving on charitable donations than those of most previous 
studies, which generally ranged from 1.2 to 1.5—the coefficient was -4.97 in the Schiff 
(1985) study. However, the estimate was statistically insignificant. Compared to the 
general range of the price elasticity, the estimated price elasticity in this study was a little 
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higher than the general range of the coefficient. The range of the price elasticity can be 
varied because Bakija and Heim (2011) concluded different time-path of tax incentives 
across states imply an elasticity of charitable giving in response to a persistent change in 
price that is in excess of one in absolute value. The estimated price elasticity is not 
strictly comparable to most published studies because this study estimated a constant 
slope, rather than a constant elasticity functional form and because the estimates are for 
per capita giving whereas most others are for household giving.  
The percentage of state level populations who are 65 years or over has a 
negative impact on private giving but the estimate is not statistically significant. The 
percentage of state level owner occupied houses has a negative but insignificant impact 
on private giving to human service organizations.  
The results for the socio-demographic variables to estimate the coefficient on 
philanthropic giving to human service organizations are presented in Appendix A. Age, 
gender, education level, ethnicity, marital status, employment status, health condition, 
wealth, and income statistically significantly affect the amount of donations to human 
service organizations. For example, when a donor is a year older, donors are statistically 
significantly more likely to donate 93.2 cents in per capita giving to human service 
organizations than younger donors (p<0.001). Donors who have a master’s or PhD 
degrees are statistically significantly more likely to donate 52.4 cents per capita to human 
service organizations than donors with a high school education or less (p<0.001). Married 
donors are statistically significantly more likely to donate 48.8 cent per capita to human 
service organizations than never married donors (p<0.001). When the income is increased 
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a dollar, donors are statistically significantly more likely to donate 0.02 cents per capita 
to human service organizations (p<0.05). 
The OLS results of the joint crowd out of government expenditures with other 
independent variables are reported in Appendix A in detail. The results indicate that 
higher state per capita income has a positive impact on state spending on public welfare 
and the estimate is not statistically significant. That is, when a dollar per capita of state 
level income increased, state expenditures on public welfare is increased approximately 
$1.86 per capita. A higher percentage of state level poverty has a positive and statistically 
insignificant impact on state spending on public welfare. The percentage of state level 
populations who are 65 or over has a positive impact on state spending on public welfare, 
but is statistically insignificant. The percentage of state –level owner-occupied houses has 
a negative impact on state spending on public welfare but it is statistically insignificant. 
That is, when one percent of state level owner occupied house increased, state 
governments would decreased $374.90 per capita of their expenditures on public welfare, 
but the estimate is not statistically significant.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
Conclusion 
Crowd-out estimates tell us how effective government expenditures on public 
welfare are in raising total expenditures on public services. Specifically, the joint crowd-
out results address the more detailed impact of government spending on public welfare 
on state and private donations to human service organizations. Empirically, crowd-out 
effects have been probed to address the relationship between government involvements 
and private participations to provide social services under the classic crowding-out 
hypothesis. Under the classic crowd-out hypothesis, the government believes that 
government participation in providing public services crowds out private participation. 
That is, when a charitable organization receives government spending, philanthropic 
donations to the organizations could fall because donors let the given tax moneys 
substitute for the organizations that donate. This hypothesis has been supported by 
empirical studies. Although the crowd-out effects are empirically proven as a statistical 
truth, the relationship has been generally examined with philanthropic giving to different 
types of nonprofit organizations rather than human service organizations. In addition, the 
estimated coefficients from empirical studies have been repeatedly criticized by 
researchers, such as biased coefficients and limited information about philanthropic 
giving to nonprofit organizations. A few studies have probed the crowd-out hypothesis 
focused on human service organizations without the identified limitations. This study 
provided unique insight about the crowd-out effect for human service organizations using 
a superior date set for individual giving (COPPS) and to identify both simple and joint 
crowd-out effects.  
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Combining information from COPPS 2007 with the data on federal and state 
government expenditures on public welfare that was sourced by Census data bases, this 
study was able to provide information on charitable giving to human service 
organizations and federal and state government expenditures on public welfare. A 
reduced form was estimated in which contributions and state spending each depends on 
federal grants, income, price, poverty rate, the percentage of age 65 or over, the 
percentage of house ownership, and socio-demographic variables.  
As addressed in the results, three conclusions seem apparent. First, the joint 
crowd-out of donations, if it exists, is small in magnitude, with a point estimate of 5.1 
cents per capita in donations to human service organizations. The estimated simple 
crowd-out effect was even smaller than the estimated joint crowd-out effect.  
In addition, federal government spending on public welfare crowds out state 
government spending on public welfare. The negative impact of federal government 
spending on state and local government spending was inconsistent result than other 
empirical studies. Researchers have reported the positive impact of federal government 
spending on state government spending is called ‘flypaper effect’—noting that money 
sticks where it hits (Chernick, 1099; Knight, 2002; Inman, 2008; Schiff & 
Steinberg ,1988; Steinberg (1990), Thornton, 2012).
18
 Although, the results from this 
                                           
18 According to Inman (2008), in the late 1960/s James Henderson and Edward Gramlich (1969) studied 
the direction of empirical research on how local government tax and spend. They reported an extra dollar of 
personal income increased government spending on the order of $0.02 to $0.05 but an equivalent extra 
dollar of grant-in-aid increased government spending by $0.30 to often as much as full dollar. When they 
reported this effect, Arthur Okun call this larger effect of lump-sum aid on government spending a ‘flypaper 
effect’ which indicates money seems to stick where it hits. The flypaper effect appears to be a real 
phenomenon and has been repeatedly probed in previous studies which have consistently explained the 
crowd-in effects between federal spending and state spending. Chernick (1979) and Knight (2002) provided 
specification of a political contract between a central government and local governments as a way to 
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study found crowd-in effect of federal spending on state spending, it is unable to support 
or reject the flypaper effect because of large standard errors. 
In summary, several implications follow from the results. The findings relating 
to the joint crowd-out effect lend support to the joint crowd-out theory (Lindsey & 
Steinberg, 1990; Schiff & Steinberg, 1988; Steinberg, 1983). Steinberg (1988) and 
Lindsey and Steinberg (1990) indicated that the estimated coefficients with the simple 
crowd-out could be smaller than the coefficients with the joint crowd-out. The results in 
this study lend support to the theory of joint crowd-out effects. Thus, the joint crowd-out 
could more accurately estimate the relationship between government spending and 
private giving. Based on the overall effects of federal government spending on private 
giving to provide social welfare services, the positive effects of government involvements 
to provide public services may be supported by the results from this study. Rose-
Ackerman (1984) asserted that government spending to charity need not reduce total 
expenditures for providing public services and may even lead to increased private giving. 
The results in this study demonstrate that overall government efforts to fund public 
services do not have a serious negative impact on providing social services to people in 
need, even if the crowd-out effect does occur. This finding is extremely useful to social 
welfare policymakers or social work administrators charged with designing public 
welfare programs or enforcing public policies for people in need.  
Furthermore, fixed-sum grants can increase private giving because the grants 
can increase marginal benefits of private donations. In addition, if public policy makers 
                                                                                                                             
understand the ‘flypaper effect’. According to Inman (2008), over 3,500 research papers have supported the 
flypaper effect, including Henderson and Gramlich (1968, as cited in Inman, 2008), Gramlich (1969, as 
cited in Inman, 2008), Thornton (2012), Schiff and Steinberg (1988), and Steinberg (1990). 
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provide better information about the charities that received their donations, the charitable 
donors are more likely to donate to their charities.  
Limitations and Suggestions 
In examining the interaction between government expenditures on social welfare 
and private contributions to human service organizations, there are certain problems 
arising from data limitations. Although, the philanthropic giving to human service 
organizations was conceptually identified as the charitable giving to organizations for 
people in need and giving to youth and family charities, the human services segment 
includes not only increasing the well-being of the poor, but also providing services for 
programs like disaster prevention and relief, recreation, environments, and athletics, 
many of which may benefit the non-poor. In this study, charitable giving to nonprofit 
organizations was not included to estimate the philanthropic giving to human service 
organizations. Thus, this study may have underestimated charitable giving.  
Similar to the limitation of the conceptual definition for private giving to human 
service organizations, the conceptual definition of government expenditures of public 
welfare in this study may be limited to denoting government spending for social welfare. 
It is true that human service organizations have received government spending not only 
from the identified sources in this study, but also from other government resources. Some 
of the federal grants to human service organizations is passed on by the state government 
contracting out welfare expenditures or making grants to welfare organizations. The 
government data that used in this study is not allows recognizing this identification. Also, 
donors many not react to direct state provision of welfare services or provision through 
contracting out, or relatively untied grants. In this study, the different sources of 
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government grants were treated as the same government grants. That is, as Cuellar (2004) 
noted, the most difficult problem to overcome is to accurately match private and public 
expenditures. Consequently, the data on private charity and government spending to 
social welfare may not only understate private charity to human service organizations, 
but may also dampen the response of charitable giving to changes in government 
spending because of the identified conceptual definitions for private giving and 
government spending on social welfare in this study.  
In addition, crowd-out effects may likely be more sensitive to large gift donors 
who have donated a large amount of money such as millionaire donors. According to 
GivingUSA Foundation (2011), approximately 20 percent of donors donated almost 80 
percent of the total donations in 2010. Generally, large donors would be affected more by 
crowd-out than donors who give a small amount of money. For future empirical work, the 
joint crowd-out effect may be more precisely examined with charitable giving from 
millionaire donors.  
Motivations of charitable giving studies have been examined by researchers such 
as Andreoni (2006) and Riber & Wilhelm (2002). However, we know very little about 
how donors respond either to changing ideological cues or to better information about the 
quality of charitable activity. In order to accurately understand the relationship between 
the change of government welfare spending and the change of private giving to human 
service organizations, the motivations of charitable giving in relation to political 
relationship should be clearly addressed.    
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Appendix A: Joint crowd-out results  
Independent Variables 
Per Capita 
Donations 
Per Capita 
State Spending 
Per Capita Donations  
(w/ a new giving) 
Federal spending -0.0515(0.0418) 0.409(0.553) -0.313(0.0228) 
State income 0.001(0.001) 0.019(0.013) -0.0013(0.010) 
State poverty rate -1.372(1.784) 7.184(20.223) -13.103(13.091) 
State age 65 or more  -2.570(1.641) 32.403(51.667)  -27.862(11.545) 
State owner occupied house -0.521(0.942) -3.749(2.609) 1.410(7.028) 
^Price of giving  -2.152(0.325)*** - -25.150(3.620)*** 
Age  0.932(0.260)*** - 0.932(0.260)*** 
Gender  Male  -16.250(9.439)*  -16.250(9.439)* 
Education 
level 
Some college 21.359(6.538)*** - 21.359(6.538)*** 
College graduate 37.238(7.713)*** - 37.238(7.713)*** 
Graduate 52.346(13.367)*** - 52.346(13.367)*** 
Ethnicity  Black -12.175(9.015) - -12.175(9.015) 
Native American 30.006(29.317) - 30.006(29.317) 
Asian -82.219(22.471)*** - -82.219(22.471)*** 
Hispanic -50.888(12.156)*** - -50.888(12.156)*** 
Others 9.176(19.446) - 9.176(19.446) 
Marital 
Status 
Never married  -48.835(9.914)*** - -48.835(9.914)*** 
Widowed -20.615(16.234) - -20.615(16.234) 
Divorced -18.628(10.001)* - -18.628(10.001)* 
Separated -41.047(19.576)** - -41.047(19.576)** 
Religion Catholic 9.585(15.562) - 9.585(15.562) 
Jewish 34.173(23.850) - 34.173(23.850) 
Protestant 8.680(14.729) - 8.680(14.729) 
Non-Christian 33.494(25.099) - 33.494(25.099) 
Orthodox -3.502(39.287) - -3.502(39.287) 
Employment  
status 
Unemployed -12.021(15.309) - -12.021(15.309) 
Retired 0.724(9.700) - 0.724(9.700) 
Disabled -28.455(16.108)* - -28.455(16.108)* 
Others 9.852(9.698) - 9.852(9.698) 
Health  
condition 
Good -3.187(6.349) - -3.187(6.349) 
Fair -28.717(10.995)** - -28.717(10.995)** 
Poor -8.401(13.069) - -8.401(13.069) 
Number of Kids 2.372(3.086) - 2.372(3.086) 
Wealth with no house 6.162(3.504)* - 6.162(3.504)* 
Income 0.0002(0.000)** - 0.0002(0.000)** 
Total sample  6,629 50 6,629 
- Marginal effect with numeric derivatives and integrals (dydx) were estimated, except the price of 
giving. The coefficient for the price of giving is elasticity form.  
- Delta method standard errors are in parenthesis. 
- The coefficients of per capita donations are estimated by Tobit, the coefficients of per capita state 
spending are estimated by OLS. The estimated coefficients are the estimated average marginal effect 
with respect to observable donations. 
- The reported coefficients are the average incremental effect on observable giving relative to the 
excluded category.  
- Stacked regression was estimated with extended giving variable to HSOs, including needy giving, 
youth and family giving, religious giving, and combination giving. 
-Percentage of each socio-demographic variable was estimated after weighted with family weight 
2007 variable. Also, the responding households who did not respond on philanthropic section were 
excluded to estimate the socio-demographic characteristics and philanthropic behavior.  
***P<0.001, **P<0.05, * P<0.10 
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Appendix B: Federal, state and local government factors in 2005 
STATE  
Federal 
expenditure  
(per capita) 
State & local 
expenditure  
(per capita) 
Median 
Income 
(per capita) 
Poverty  
Rate 
% of the 
total 
population 
over 65 
% of 
housing 
units in 
a state 
Alabama  $0.0  $1,120.0  $29,685  16.9% 12.9% 70.5% 
Alaska  $74.5  $2,085.0  $35,456  10.8% 6.6% 63.0% 
Arizona  $142.3  $983.0  $30,088  14.4% 12.6% 68.2% 
Arkansas  $0.0  $1,225.0  $26,674  17.2% 13.5% 67.8% 
California  $622.6  $1,225.0  $36,868  13.3% 10.5% 58.4% 
Colorado  $216.1  $738.0  $37,474  10.9% 9.7% 67.8% 
Connecticut  $105.3  $1,323.0  $47,650  8.3% 13.0% 69.5% 
Delaware  $2.2  $1,455.0  $37,162  10.3% 13.0% 72.4% 
Florida  $0.0  $992.0  $34,140  12.8% 16.6% 69.6% 
Georgia  $74.6  $907.0  $30,986  14.5% 9.2% 66.8% 
Hawaii  $0.0  $1,124.0  $34,520  9.9% 13.6% 59.7% 
Idaho  $0.0  $999.0  $28,393  13.4% 11.2% 71.4% 
Illinois  $146.6  $1,048.0  $36,259  12.0% 11.5% 69.9% 
Indiana  $50.7  $1,023.0  $31,180  12.2% 11.9% 72.0% 
Iowa  $58.9  $1,184.0  $31,804  10.8% 14.0% 73.1% 
Kansas  $5.0  $1,030.0  $32,907  11.7% 12.4% 69.5% 
Kentucky $12.0  $1,351.0  $28,323  16.9% 12.2% 70.6% 
Louisiana $20.1  $1,064.0  $24,671  20.2% 11.4% 67.8% 
Maine $13.9  $1,889.0  $30,886  12.3% 14.1% 71.8% 
Maryland $0.0  $1,159.0  $42,077  8.3% 11.2% 69.0% 
Massachusetts $52.1  $1,779.0  $43,466  10.3% 12.9% 64.0% 
Michigan  $221.0  $980.0  $32,800  13.1% 12.1% 74.7% 
Minnesota $113.1  $1,776.0  $37,366  9.2% 11.6% 75.8% 
Mississippi $79.1  $1,289.0  $25,033  21.0% 11.9% 69.9% 
Missouri  $17.3  $1,027.0  $31,313  13.6% 12.8% 70.6% 
Montana  $20.8  $911.0  $28,934  14.6% 13.3% 69.1% 
Nebraska  $12.8  $1,132.0  $33,000  11.0% 12.8% 68.2% 
Nevada  $26.5  $718.0  $35,818  11.1% 11.2% 60.7% 
New Hampshire  $74.0  $1,119.0  $37,925  7.6% 11.9% 73.0% 
New Jersey  $156.8  $1,426.0  $43,897  8.7% 12.5% 67.3% 
New Mexico  $0.0  $1,466.0  $27,947  18.4% 12.1% 69.3% 
New York  $518.1  $2,236.0  $39,945  13.9% 12.7% 55.3% 
North Carolina  $155.3  $1,111.0  $31,068  14.9% 11.7% 68.2% 
North Dakota  $20.3  $1,146.0  $31,331  11.6% 14.2% 67.5% 
Ohio  $143.4  $1,450.0  $31,848  13.0% 12.8% 69.9% 
Oklahoma  $13.1  $1,137.0  $29,946  16.4% 12.9% 67.9% 
Oregon  $82.6  $1,048.0  $32,194  14.1% 12.6% 63.8% 
Pennsylvania  $180.6  $1,628.0  $34,916  11.9% 14.6% 71.5% 
Rhode Island  $25.4  $2,014.0  $35,305  11.9% 13.6% 62.7% 
South Carolina  $13.8  $1,105.0  $28,266  15.6% 12.3% 70.1% 
South Dakota  $3.7  $957.0  $32,686  13.6% 13.6% 69.0% 
Tennessee $134.8  $1,257.0  $30,990  15.6% 12.2% 69.3% 
Texas  $29.3  $866.0  $32,507  17.5% 9.6% 64.7% 
Utah  $11.4  $924.0  $27,268  10.5% 8.5% 70.6% 
Vermont  $1.0  $1,799.0  $32,766  10.4% 12.8% 71.1% 
Virginia  $83.3  $951.0  $37,568  10.0% 11.2% 69.6% 
Washington  $8.0  $1,048.0  $35,210  12.0% 11.1% 64.7% 
West Virginia  $19.5  $1,291.0  $26,068  18.0% 15.0% 75.4% 
Wisconsin  $100.9  $1,296.0  $33,303  10.2% 12.5% 70.1% 
Wyoming  $2.2  $1,137.0  $37,308  10.6% 12.0% 71.5% 
Source: The Public Policy Institute of New York State, Inc. (http://www.ppinys.org/reports/jtf/ 
welfarespending.htm) and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Released February 2007.  
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